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On Random Social Choice Functions
with the Tops-only Property∗
Shurojit Chatterji† and Huaxia Zeng‡
January 17, 2018
Abstract
We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice
Function (or RSCF) satisﬁes the tops-only property if the social lottery under each pref-
erence proﬁle depends only on the peaks of voters’ preferences. We identify a general
condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property)
which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only
property. We show that our condition applies to important classes of voting domains
which include restricted connected domains (Sato, 2013) and the multi-dimensional
single-peaked domain (Barbera` et al., 1993). As an application of our result, we show
that every ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof RSCF deﬁned on the multi-dimensional
single-peaked domain is a random dictatorship.
Keywords: Random Social Choice Functions; Unanimity; Strategy-proofness; The
Tops-only Property; The Interior Property; The Exterior Property
JEL Classiﬁcation: D71.
1 Introduction
Randomization is a natural device which is ubiquitous in economic environments. It is, for
instance, used to bring fairness to the ex-ante consideration of collective decision making
problems, object assignment problems, etc. Recently, randomization has been shown to
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Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi. We are grateful to these institutes for their hospitality and support.
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signiﬁcantly enlarge the scope of designing “well-behaved” voting mechanisms (Chatterji
et al., 2014). In this paper, we study randomization in the classic voting environment where
each voter submits an ordinal strict preference order over a ﬁnite set of alternatives; a
“desirable” social lottery over all alternatives is chosen, and no money transfer is allowed.
Each voter’s preference order is her private information. A Random Social Choice Function
(or RSCF) determines the social lottery under every proﬁle of reported preferences. In
particular, if a degenerate lottery, i.e., one where an alternative receives probability one,
is chosen under each preference proﬁle, the RSCF is referred to as a Deterministic Social
Choice Function (or DSCF).
Starting from the seminal work of Gibbard (1977), RSCFs have increasingly received
attention in a growing literature,1 where the incentives for truthfully revealing private infor-
mation are prominently at the forefront. Fixing an ordinal preference and a utility function
representing the ordinal preference, we assume that each voter evaluates lotteries according
to the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis. We then adopt the notion of
strategy-proofness established by Gibbard (1977) which requires that no voter can obtain a
strictly higher expected utility by misreporting her preferences for any utility representing
her true ordinal preference and any belief regarding the reports of other voters. Equivalently,
this notion of strategy-proofness can be reformulated in terms of (strong) ﬁrst-order stochas-
tic dominance which says that for each voter, the social lottery induced by truthtelling
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (according to her true ordinal preference) any lottery
obtained via a unilateral misrepresentation.
If strategy-proofness is the only concern, one can construct a constant RSCF which
ignores all information of voters’ preferences and ﬁxes a lottery as the social outcome for
every preference proﬁle. However, such an RSCF is clearly not desirable. On the other hand,
while allowing the social lottery to vary with preference proﬁles is desirable, maintaining
strategy-proofness becomes correspondingly harder as the social lottery begins to depend
more intricately on preferences. In this paper, we study preference domains where strategy-
proof RSCFs use only the peaks of voters’ preferences to calculate the social lottery. This
class of RSCFs is said to satisfy the tops-only property, which implies that if the peaks of
each voter across two preference proﬁles are identical, the social lottery remains the same;
RSCFs satisfying this property are pervasive in the literature. There however remains the
possibility that by insisting on the tops-only property, one may constrain signiﬁcantly the
scope for designing strategy-proof RSCFs. Indeed, there exist other intuitive RSCFs that use
some non-top information and have nice incentive properties, e.g., the point voting schemes
1There are numerous papers (e.g., Barbera`, 1979; Hylland, 1980; Duggan, 1996; Dutta et al., 2002; Ehlers
et al., 2002; Dutta et al., 2007; Sen, 2011; Picot and Sen, 2012; Chatterji et al., 2012; Aziz et al., 2014; Aziz
and Stursberg, 2014; Chatterji et al., 2014; Peters et al., 2014; Pycia and U¨nver, 2015; Brandl et al., 2016)
that study RSCFs.
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of Barbera` (1979).2 In view of this possibility, establishing the tops-only property as a
consequence of strategy-proofness is invariably a critical step in the literature that provides
characterization results for strategy-proof voting rules and allocation rules.3 This is typically
accomplished by verifying explicitly that the domain in question is a tops-only domain, i.e.,
one where every strategy-proof and unanimous RSCF must be tops-only.4 For tops-only
domains, there is thus no loss of design possibilities in restricting attention to tops-only
RSCFs.
It is well-known that appropriate richness conditions are required on domains in order
for them to be tops-only domains. We observe in this paper that it is possible for a domain
to be tops-only for DSCFs without being tops-only for RSCFs (see Example 1). We provide
a new suﬃcient condition for a domain to be tops-only for RSCFs (see the Theorem). Im-
portantly, we emphasize that under our suﬃcient condition, the tops-only property emerges
endogenously: Our methodology allows us to assert this property without requiring us to
explicitly characterize the class of all unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs. Our condition
is context free, and should be useful in delineating the possibilities for designing simple and
desirable strategy-proof RSCFs by facilitating characterization results that are based on the
tops-only property in a variety of settings.
Before describing our condition, we note that RSCFs satisfying the tops-only property
aﬀord additional conveniences to a planner confronted with the task of designing an RSCF
on a particular restricted domain of preferences. One the one hand, such rules are easier
to operationalize as they have to be deﬁned for a much smaller number of preference pro-
ﬁles, while on the other hand, the actual act of agents reporting their preferences simpliﬁes
as each agent merely reports her top ranked alternative. The truthful reporting of one’s
top alternative is of course predicated upon there being no gainful manipulations of prefer-
2A point voting scheme is a randomized scoring rule. Assume that there are m alternatives and N voters,
and all ordinal preferences on alternatives are strict. A non-negative real number αk is the score associated
to the kth ranked alternative according to a preference. A higher ranked alternative naturally receives a
higher score, i.e., α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm ≥ 0, and moreover,
∑m
k=1 αk =
1
N . After all voters submit their
preferences, the probability assigned to an alternative is the sum of scores it receives from each preference.
3In the voting environment, see the results on dictatorship (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), ran-
dom dictatorship (Gibbard, 1977), voting by committees (Barbera` et al., 1991), phantom voter rules and
generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980; Border and Jordan, 1983; Barbera` et al., 1993; Ching, 1997;
Reﬀgen, 2015), ﬁxed-probabilistic-ballots rules (Ehlers et al., 2002), voting by issues (Nehring and Puppe,
2007), meet social choice functions (Mishra and Roy, 2012) and generalized random dictatorship (Chatterji
et al., 2012). In economic environments, see the results on dictatorship (Barbera` and Peleg, 1990; Zhou,
1991), random dictatorship (Dutta et al., 2002), and minimax rules (Barbera` and Jackson, 1994). In the fair
division literature, see the results on uniform rules (Sprumont, 1991) and sequential allotment rules (Barbera`
et al., 1997). For more related literature, please refer to the survey paper of Sprumont (1995).
4In a unanimous RSCF, if all voters share the same peak in a preference proﬁle, this peak is chosen
with probability one. This is a natural condition to impose on the social lottery. The point voting schemes
mentioned earlier need not satisfy unanimity.
3
ences. This task of verifying that there are no gainful manipulations too is much simpler
with tops-only RSCFs as any manipulation using a preference with the same top as the true
preference does not aﬀect the social lottery and hence can never be beneﬁcial.5 In mod-
els with many agents, many alternatives and with large variation in preferences with the
same top, these informational and computational gains aﬀorded by tops-only RSCFs may be
considerable. Indeed, calculating the computational costs associated to eliciting preferences
and ﬁnding gainful manipulations is at the forefront of a recent and growing literature (e.g.,
Ailon, 2010; Faliszewski and Procaccia, 2010; Vaish et al., 2016) which studies, for instance,
recommendation systems and other internet related design problems.6
Our condition requires that a particular Interior Property and an Exterior Property,
respectively, hold. Both the Interior Property and the Exterior Property are variations of
the notion of connectedness that is well studied in preference domains (e.g., Monjardet,
2009; Sato, 2013; Cho, 2016). A preference domain is connected if every pair of distinct
preferences is connected via a path of preferences in the domain, where each consecutive pair
of preferences is adjacent, in other words, diﬀers in the ranking of exactly one contiguous pair
of alternatives. Connectedness thus implies that the diﬀerences between two preferences can
be reconciled via a trackable successive evolution process. The Interior Property implements
the connectedness idea on each sub-domain of preferences with a common peak. In order to
verify that an RSCF satisﬁes the tops-only property, we need to check that the social lottery
remains unchanged when an arbitrary agent switches to a diﬀerent preference with the same
peak. Since such a check requires one to consider only pairs of preferences with the same
peak, one might expect that the relevant restriction on domains to render them tops-only
domains be one that, like the Interior Property, applies to each sub-domain of preferences
with the same peak. However, it does not suﬃce to restrict attention to each sub-domain of
preferences with the same peak (see Example 2); we need to augment the Interior Property
by the Exterior Property which is a restriction that holds across sub-domains with diﬀerent
peaks. To describe the Exterior Property, we introduce the notion of isolation. A pair of
alternatives, say x and y, is termed isolated in a pair of preferences if we can partition the
5For instance, assume that there are m alternatives and the domain of preferences contains all linear
orders. Accordingly, under each preference proﬁle, each agent has m! − 1 possible manipulations in an
RSCF, while the degree of possible manipulations is signiﬁcantly reduced to m− 1 in a tops-only RSCF.
6In a voting system, it might be too demanding to elicit a voter’s full ranking on a large set of alternatives.
Instead, a voter is assumed to focus on a few alternatives which are ranked above all others (e.g., Ailon, 2010;
Reﬀgen, 2011). Similarly, detecting a manipulation in a mechanism that depends too much on information
on preferences would be computationally hard, e.g., see the second-order Copeland Schemes of Bartholdi III
et al. (1989). In this context, note that imposing the tops-only property to voting schemes substantially
simpliﬁes and shortens the testing time of the Algorithm Greedy-Manipulation of Bartholdi III et al. (1989)
which is adopted to calculate or to claim the non-existence of a gainful manipulation in worst-case polynomial
time. Recently, robustness of rules to manipulation has been used as a criteria for comparing generalized
median voter rules (see Arribillaga and Masso´, 2016).
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alternative set into two disjoint subsets, one containing x and the other containing y, where
both preferences agree to rank one subset above the other. A sequence of preferences is an
(x, y) isolation path if alternatives x and y remain isolated across each pair of successive
preferences. The Exterior Property requires that for any two preferences that rank x above
y and have distinct peaks, there be an (x, y) isolation path that starts at one preference
and ends at the other.7 Finally, we note that one may use appropriate graphs to verify
our condition in an arbitrary preference domain. The Interior Property immediately holds
whenever the graph of adjacencies over each sub-domain with the same peak is a connected
graph.8 An analogous graph based on the notion of isolation can be used to verify the
Exterior Property.
We now turn to applications of our Theorem. It is immediate that our condition holds
whenever a domain is connected in the sense of Sato (2013) (see Proposition 1). This class
of domains covers many well studied domains that include the complete domain (Gibbard,
1973), the single-peaked domain (Moulin, 1980; Demange, 1982), the single-dipped domain
(Barbera` et al., 2012) and single-crossing domains (Saporiti, 2009; Carroll, 2012). Therefore,
our result can be used to characterize strategy-proof rules in all these domains by restricting
attention to tops-only RSCFs. The veriﬁcation of our condition can be less straightforward in
a multi-dimensional setting. While it is possible to write a matrix based algorithm to verify
our condition on a given domain, we do not pursue this approach here, but provide instead a
direct veriﬁcation of our condition on the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain introduced
by Barbera` et al. (1993) (see Proposition 2). We then use this result to derive a new
characterization: Every ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof RSCF on the multi-dimensional
single-peaked domain is a random dictatorship (see Proposition 3).9
Our model uses an ordinal formulation of strategy-proofness introduced by Gibbard
(1977). An alternative formulation of strategy-proofness uses cardinal information on prefer-
ences (e.g., Hylland, 1980; Duggan, 1996; Dutta et al., 2007). Here too the tops-only property
plays an important role in characterizing random strategy-proof voting rules. We conjecture
7Formulating the Exterior Property using a path of adjacent preferences (as in the Interior Property) to
connect two preferences with distinct peaks turns out to be too demanding, and in particular narrows the
scope of studying preferences in the multi-dimensional setting (see Section 4.2).
8Given a domain, we construct a graph where vertices are preferences, and a pair of preferences constitutes
an edge if and only if they are adjacent. The graph is termed a “connected” graph if we can move from one
vertex to another via a path of edges.
9Ex-post eﬃciency implies that an alternative that is Pareto dominated by another alternative in a
preference proﬁle should receive zero probability in the corresponding social lottery. One important class
of ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof RSCFs is random dictatorships. Assume that there are N voters,
and consider, for simplicity, a preference proﬁle where all peaks of preferences are distinct. A particular
formulation of a random dictatorship determines the corresponding social lottery by choosing each voter’s
peak of preference with probability 1N . The formal deﬁnition of a random dictatorship can be found in
Section 4.3.
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that a version of our richness condition would allow us to endogenize the tops-only prop-
erty in these cardinal models. Earlier work has studied the tops-only property for DSCFs.
Weymark (2008) initiated the study of the tops-only property with single-peaked preferences
on a real line and continuous preferences on a metric space. Subsequent work focuses on
the case of ﬁnite alternatives and strict preferences, e.g., generalized single-peaked domains
(Nehring and Puppe, 2007) and two general richness conditions (Chatterji and Sen, 2011) for
tops-only domains. Their suﬃcient conditions are only valid for DSCFs, and cannot directly
be applied to RSCFs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
deﬁnitions. Section 3 presents the main result. Section 4 provides three applications while
Section 5 elaborates on the relation to earlier literature, and brieﬂy discusses the necessity
of our condition. The Appendix gathers all omitted proofs and some additional material.
2 Preliminaries
Let A = {a, b, c, . . . } be a ﬁnite set of alternatives with |A| = m ≥ 3, and Δ(A) denote
the lottery space on A. An element of Δ(A) is a lottery or a probability distribution over
alternatives. In particular, ea ∈ Δ(A) is a degenerate lottery where alternative a is chosen
with probability one. Let I = {1, . . . , N} be a ﬁnite set of voters with |I| = N ≥ 1.10
Each voter i has a (strict preference) order Pi over A which is antisymmetric, complete and
transitive, i.e., a linear order. For any a, b ∈ A, aPib is interpreted as “a is strictly preferred
to b according to Pi”.
11 Let P denote the set containing all linear orders over A. The
set of all admissible orders is a set D ⊆ P, referred to as the preference domain.12 Let
rk(Pi) denote the kth ranked alternative in Pi, k = 1, . . . ,m. A pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A
is contiguous in Pi if {a, b} = {rk(Pi), rk+1(Pi)} for some 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1. Accordingly,
let aPi!b denote that a and b are contiguous in Pi, and aPib. Given 1 ≤ k ≤ m and
Pi ∈ D, Bk(Pi) = ∪kt=1{rt(Pi)} is the set of top-k ranked alternatives. For notational
convenience, let Da = {Pi ∈ D|r1(Pi) = a} denote the set of preferences with peak a.
Correspondingly, a domain D is minimally rich if Da = ∅ for every a ∈ A. A preference
proﬁle P ≡ (P1, . . . , PN) ≡ (Pi, P−i) ∈ DN is an N -tuple of orders where P−i represents a
collection of N − 1 voters’ preferences without considering voter i’s preference.
A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) is a map ϕ : DN → Δ(A). At every
proﬁle P ∈ DN , ϕ(P ) is referred to as the “socially desirable” lottery associated to this
preference proﬁle. For any a ∈ A, ϕa(P ) is the probability with which alternative a will be
10The case of a single voter is included to simplify the proofs (see Chatterji and Sen, 2011).
11In a table, we specify a preference “vertically”. In a sentence, we specify a preference “horizontally”. For
instance, Pi: a b c · · · signiﬁes that a is the top, b is the second best, c is the third ranked alternative while
the rest of the rankings in Pi are arbitrary.
12We refer to P as the complete domain. When D = P, D is referred to as a restricted domain.
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chosen in the social lottery ϕ(P ). Thus, ϕa(P ) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and
∑
a∈A ϕa(P ) = 1.
A Deterministic Social Choice Function (or DSCF) is a particular RSCF where a
degenerate lottery is chosen under each preference proﬁle, i.e., ϕ(P ) = ea for some a ∈ A at
proﬁle P .
An RSCF satisﬁes unanimity if it assigns probability one to any alternative that is top
ranked by all voters, i.e., RSCF ϕ : DN → Δ(A) is unanimous if [r1(Pi) = a for all
i ∈ I] ⇒ [ϕa(P ) = 1] for all a ∈ A and P ∈ DN .
An axiom stronger than unanimity is ex-post eﬃciency which requires that every Pareto
dominated alternative in a preference proﬁle must receive zero probability in the associated
social lottery. Formally, an RSCF ϕ : DN → Δ(A) is ex-post eﬃcient if for all a, b ∈ A
and P ∈ DN , [aPib for all i ∈ I] ⇒ [ϕb(P ) = 0].
An RSCF ϕ : DN → Δ(A) is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I, Pi, P ′i ∈ D and P−i ∈ DN−1,
the lottery ϕ(Pi, P−i) (strongly) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates ϕ(P ′i , P−i) according to
Pi, i.e.,
∑
x∈Bt(Pi) ϕx(Pi, P−i) ≥
∑
x∈Bt(Pi) ϕx(P
′
i , P−i), t = 1, . . . ,m.
A prominent class of RSCFs is the class of tops-only RSCFs. The social lottery selected
by these RSCFs at every preference proﬁle depends only on voters’ peaks. Formally, an
RSCF ϕ : DN → Δ(A) satisﬁes the tops-only property if [r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) for all i ∈ I] ⇒
[ϕ(P ) = ϕ(P ′)] for all P, P ′ ∈ DN . Accordingly, a domain is referred to as a tops-only
domain if every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF satisﬁes the tops-only property.13
3 The main result
In this section, we introduce a condition on domains under which every unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF satisﬁes the tops-only property. We begin by observing that a tops-
only domain for DSCFs need not be tops-only for RSCFs. We provide the following example
to illustrate.
Example 1 Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} and consider the domain D, containing fourteen
preferences, speciﬁed below.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14
a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a3 a3 a3 a4 a4 a4 a5 a5
a2 a3 a5 a1 a3 a4 a1 a2 a4 a2 a3 a5 a1 a4
a3 a2 a3 a3 a1 a3 a2 a1 a2 a3 a2 a3 a4 a1
a5 a5 a4 a5 a5 a5 a4 a5 a1 a5 a5 a2 a2 a2
a4 a4 a2 a4 a4 a1 a5 a4 a5 a1 a1 a1 a3 a3
Table 1: Domain D
13Note that to specify tops-only domains, we must restrict attention to the class of unanimous RSCFs.
Otherwise, for instance, we can construct a particular point voting scheme (recall footnote 2) with α1 <
1
N
which satisﬁes strategy-proofness, but avoids unanimity and the tops-only property.
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It is easy to verify that domain D is linked (Aswal et al., 2003).14 By Theorem 3.1 of
Aswal et al. (2003), every unanimous and strategy-proof DSCF is a dictatorship and therefore
satisﬁes the tops-only property.15 However, domain D admits the following unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF
ϕ(Pi, Pj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
2
er1(Pi) +
1
2
er1(Pj) if either Pi /∈ Da3 or Pj /∈ Da5
1
4
ea3 +
1
4
ea2 +
1
2
ea5 if Pi = P8 and Pj ∈ Da5
1
4
ea3 +
1
4
ea1 +
1
4
ea4 +
1
4
ea5 if Pi ∈ {P7, P9} and Pj ∈ Da5
which violates the tops-only property, e.g., r1(P7) = r1(P8) = a3 and ϕa2(P7, P13) = 0 = 14 =
ϕa2(P8, P13). The veriﬁcation of the strategy-proofness of ϕ is available in Appendix A. 
We identify a richness condition on domains that renders them tops-only domains. Our
condition requires two properties, which are referred to as the Interior Property and the
Exterior Property, respectively.
We partition the domain into sub-domains where all preferences in a sub-domain have
an identical peak. The Interior Property refers to a requirement across any two preferences
within a given sub-domain, while the Exterior Property refers to a requirement that applies
to any two preferences belonging to two distinct sub-domains. To describe the Interior
Property, we adopt the notion of adjacency (Sato, 2013), while to describe the Exterior
Property, we use a more general notion called isolation.
A pair of distinct preferences Pi, P
′
i ∈ D is adjacent, denoted Pi ∼A P ′i , if there exists
1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed
(i) rk(Pi) = rk+1(P
′
i ) and rk+1(Pi) = rk(P
′
i );
(ii) rt(Pi) = rt(P
′
i ) for all t = k, k + 1.
In other words, two preferences are adjacent if exactly one pair of contiguous alternatives
locally switches their relative rankings. We refer to this pair of alternatives as a local
switching pair. Given distinct Pi, P
′
i ∈ D, an Ad-path connecting Pi and P ′i is a sequence
{P ki }lk=1 such that P 1i = Pi, P li = P ′i and P ki ∼A P k+1i , k = 1, . . . , l− 1. Accordingly, we say
that a domain is connected if every pair of distinct preferences is connected via an Ad-path
in the domain.
The Interior Property requires that given two distinct preferences with the same peak,
there is an Ad-path connecting them such that every preference on the path shares that peak.
14A pair of alternatives a, b is said to be linked, denoted a ∼ b, if there exist Pi, P ′i ∈ D such that
r1(Pi) = r2(P
′
i ) = a and r2(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) = b. A domain D is linked if the alternative set can be labeled
as A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} such that (i) a1 ∼ a2 and (ii) for every 3 ≤ k ≤ m, ak ∼ as and ak ∼ at for some
1 ≤ s < t ≤ k − 1. In Example 1, a1 ∼ a2; a3 ∼ a1, a3 ∼ a2; a4 ∼ a2, a4 ∼ a3; a5 ∼ a1 and a5 ∼ a4.
15A DSCF f : DN → Δ(A) is a dictatorship if there exists i ∈ I such that for all P ∈ DN , f(P ) = er1(Pi).
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Definition 1 Domain D satisﬁes the Interior Property if for all a ∈ A and distinct
Pi, P
′
i ∈ Da, there exists an Ad-path {P ki }lk=1 ⊆ Da connecting Pi and P ′i .
Note that the Interior Property does not hold for the domain of Example 1, e.g., prefer-
ences P7, P8 and P9 form the sub-domain with peak a3, but no pair of them is adjacent.
We next present an example of a non-tops-only domain that satisﬁes the Interior Property.
Example 2 Let A = {a, b, c} and consider the domain D, containing three preferences,
speciﬁed below.
P1 P2 P3
a b b
c a c
b c a
Table 2: Domain D
Evidently, domain D satisﬁes the Interior Property, i.e., P2 ∼A P3. Moreover, domain D
admits the following two-voter unanimous and strategy-proof DSCF:
(i) f(P1, P1) = ea and f(Pi, Pj) = eb for all Pi, Pj ∈ {P2, P3}.
(ii) f(P1, P2) = f(P2, P1) = ea and f(P1, P3) = f(P3, P1) = ec,
Since social lotteries vary at proﬁles (P1, P2) and (P1, P3) in favour of the second voter’s
preference over a and c, the DSCF f does not satisfy the tops-only property. 
To ensure that a domain is a tops-only domain, the Interior Property has to be augmented
by a condition imposed on preferences with distinct peaks, so that all sub-domains (within
each of which all preferences have the same peak) are in a sense “well-organized”with respect
to each other. We refer to this condition as the Exterior Property. As a ﬁrst step towards
describing the Exterior Property, we establish the notion of isolation. Given distinct Pi, P
′
i ∈
D, alternatives x, y ∈ A are isolated in (Pi, P ′i ) if there exists 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 such that
(i) Bk(Pi) = B
k(P ′i ),
(ii) either x ∈ Bk(Pi) and y /∈ Bk(Pi), or x /∈ Bk(Pi) and y ∈ Bk(Pi).
In an isolation, the two sets of top-k ranked alternatives in Pi and P
′
i are identical, include
one alternative in {x, y} and exclude the other. Note that if x and y are isolated in (Pi, P ′i ),
the relative rankings of x and y are identical in Pi and P
′
i , i.e., [xPiy] ⇔ [xP ′iy].
Remark 1 An isolation is independent of an adjacency since the preferences in the deﬁnition
of an isolation are not necessarily adjacent. Given Pi, P
′
i ∈ D with Pi ∼A P ′i , two alternatives
x, y ∈ A are isolated in (Pi, P ′i ) if and only if the relative rankings of x and y are identical
in Pi and P
′
i . 
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Now, we present a result (Lemma 1 below) which plays an important role in endoge-
nously establishing the tops-only property. For simplicity, consider a two-voter strategy-
proof RSCF. Voter i has two adjacent preferences Pi and P
′
i where the local switching pair
is x and y. Voter j also has two preferences Pj and P
′
j where x and y are isolated. In other
words, voter i disagrees exactly on the relative ranking of x and y while voter j happens to
agree on the relative ranking of x and y in the sense of an isolation (for instance, one subset
of alternatives containing x is considered better than the complementary subset containing
y). Lemma 1 asserts that if the social lottery does not vary according to voter i’s report
on her preference when voter j reports Pj, i.e., ϕ(Pi, Pj) = ϕ(P
′
i , Pj), then the social lottery
should not be aﬀected by voter i’s report in the situation voter j reports P ′j either, i.e.,
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j) = ϕ(P
′
i , P
′
j). Note that this result is independent of the Interior Property and is
generated simply by the combination of an adjacency and an isolation.
Lemma 1 Let ϕ : DN → Δ(A) be a strategy-proof RSCF. Given Pi, P ′i ∈ D with Pi ∼A P ′i ,
assume xPi!y and yP
′
i !x. Given Pj, P
′
j ∈ D, if x and y are isolated in (Pj, P ′j), then for all
P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2, we have
[
ϕ(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P ′i , Pj, P−{i,j})
]⇒ [ϕ(Pi, P ′j , P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P ′i , P ′j , P−{i,j})
]
.
Proof : Given Pi and P
′
i , strategy-proofness implies
Statement (1) ϕz(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) = ϕz(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}) for all z /∈ {x, y} and P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2.16
Therefore, to verify ϕ(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}), it suﬃces to show either
ϕx(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) = ϕx(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}) or ϕy(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) = ϕy(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}).
Next, since x and y are isolated in (Pj, P
′
j), there exists 1 ≤ t ≤ m − 1 such that
either x ∈ Bt(Pj) = Bt(P ′j) and y /∈ Bt(Pj) = Bt(P ′j), or x /∈ Bt(Pj) = Bt(P ′j) and
y ∈ Bt(Pj) = Bt(P ′j). We assume x ∈ Bt(Pj) = Bt(P ′j) and y /∈ Bt(Pj) = Bt(P ′j). The
veriﬁcation related to the other case is symmetric and we hence omit it. Consequently,
strategy-proofness implies that for all P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2,
Statement (2)
∑
z∈Bt(Pj) ϕz(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) =
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j) ϕz(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j});
Statement (3)
∑
z∈Bt(Pj) ϕz(P
′
i , Pj, P−{i,j}) =
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j) ϕz(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}).
16Lemma 2 of Gibbard (1977) shows that if Bk(Pi) = B
k(P ′i ) ≡ B, then strategy-proofness implies∑
a∈B ϕa(Pi, P−i) =
∑
a∈B ϕa(P
′
i , P−i) for all P−i ∈ DN−1. The veriﬁcation of this lemma can be adapted
to verify Statement (1) and Statements (2) and (3) below as well.
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Finally we have
ϕx(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) =
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j)
ϕz(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j})−
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j)\{x}
ϕz(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j})
=
∑
z∈Bt(Pj)
ϕz(Pi, Pj , P−{i,j})−
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j)\{x}
ϕz(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) by Statement (2)
=
∑
z∈Bt(Pj)
ϕz(P
′
i , Pj , P−{i,j})−
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j)\{x}
ϕz(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) by the hypothesis of Lemma 1
=
∑
z∈Bt(Pj)
ϕz(P
′
i , Pj , P−{i,j})−
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j)\{x}
ϕz(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}) by Statement (1)
=
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j)
ϕz(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j})−
∑
z∈Bt(P ′j)\{x}
ϕz(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}) by Statement (3)
= ϕx(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}).
Therefore, ϕ(Pi, P
′
j , P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P
′
i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}). 
Note that in Example 2, aP1c and aP2c, but a and c are not isolated in (P1, P2). Next
we slightly modify Example 2 to restore the isolation of a and c in the two preferences, and
then show how Lemma 1 forces a two-voter unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF to satisfy
the tops-only property.
Example 2 [continued] We retain preferences P2 and P3 in Example 2 (and so the In-
terior Property continues to hold), and replace preference P1 in Example 2 by P¯1 : a b c.
Thus, we have the domain D¯ = {P¯1, P2, P3}. To show that every two-voter unanimous and
strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : D¯2 → Δ(A) satisﬁes the tops-only property, it suﬃces to show
ϕ(P¯1, P2) = ϕ(P¯1, P3) (symmetrically, ϕ(P2, P¯1) = ϕ(P3, P¯1)). First, we have P2 ∼A P3,
aP2!c and cP3!a. Second, a and c are isolated in (P¯1, P2). Third, since both P2 and P3 have
peak b, unanimity implies ϕ(P2, P2) = ϕ(P2, P3). Thus, all hypotheses of Lemma 1 are met,
and hence we assert ϕ(P¯1, P2) = ϕ(P¯1, P3), as required. A similar argument applies to the
general case of an arbitrary number of voters. Therefore, D¯ is a tops-only domain. 
We next generalize the notion of isolation between two preferences to the notion of isola-
tion along a path of preferences. This will allow us to extend the applicability of Lemma 1
to a broader class of domains than the rudimentary one considered in the example above, as
Lemma 1 can then be applied to every successive pair of preferences along the path. Given
distinct Pi, P
′
i ∈ D and x, y ∈ A, let {P ki }lk=1 be a sequence of preferences (not necessarily an
Ad-path) such that P 1i = Pi, P
l
i = P
′
i , and x and y are isolated in (P
k
i , P
k+1
i ), k = 1, . . . , l−1.
Then, {P ki }lk=1 is referred to as an (x, y)-Is-path connecting Pi and P ′i . Note that either x is
preferred to y in every preference of the (x, y)-Is-path, or vice versa.
Finally we deﬁne the Exterior Property to specify the relation between preferences with
distinct peaks. The Exterior Property will say that ﬁxing a pair of preferences with distinct
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peaks and a pair of alternatives with the same relative ranking across these two preferences,
we can construct an Is-path with respect to this pair of alternatives to connect the pair of
ﬁxed preferences.
Definition 2 Domain D satisﬁes the Exterior Property if given Pi, P
′
i ∈ D with r1(Pi) =
r1(P
′
i ) and x, y ∈ A with xPiy and xP ′iy, there exists an (x, y)-Is-path connecting Pi and P ′i .
We now state our main result.
Theorem 1 A domain satisfying the Interior Property and the Exterior Property is a tops-
only domain.
Proof : Let domain D satisfy the Interior Property and the Exterior Property.
If N = 1, unanimity implies the tops-only property. Now, we provide an induction
argument on the number of voters.
Induction Hypothesis : Given N ≥ 2, for all 1 ≤ n < N , every unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCF ϕ : Dn → Δ(A) satisﬁes the tops-only property.
Given a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : DN → Δ(A), we show that ϕ satisﬁes
the tops-only property. It is easy to verify that ϕ satisﬁes the tops-only property if and only
if for all i ∈ I, Pi, P ′i ∈ D with r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) and P−i ∈ DN−1, ϕ(Pi, P−i) = ϕ(P ′i , P−i).
Given distinct Pi, P
′
i ∈ D with r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) ≡ a, the Interior Property implies that
there exists an Ad-path {P ki }lk=1 ⊆ Da connecting Pi and P ′i . Then, it suﬃces to show that
for each 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1, ϕ(P ki , P−i) = ϕ(P k+1i , P−i) for all P−i ∈ DN−1. Equivalently, we
show that for all i ∈ I, Pi, P ′i ∈ D with r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) and Pi ∼A P ′i , and P−i ∈ DN−1,
ϕ(Pi, P−i) = ϕ(P ′i , P−i).
Fixing two voters i, j ∈ I, we induce a function ψ : DN−1 → Δ(A) such that ψ(Pi, P−{i,j}) =
ϕ(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) for all Pi ∈ D and P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2. Evidently, ψ is a well-deﬁned RSCF satis-
fying unanimity and strategy-proofness.17 Hence the induction hypothesis implies that ψ sat-
isﬁes the tops-only property. Thus, for all Pi, P
′
i ∈ D with r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) and P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2,
we have ϕ(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) = ψ(Pi, P−{i,j}) = ψ(P ′i , P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P
′
i , P
′
i , P−{i,j}).
Fixing Pi, P
′
i ∈ D with r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) and Pi ∼A P ′i , we assume xPi!y and yP ′i !x. Given
Pj ∈ D and P−{i,j} ∈ DN−2, we prove ϕ(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P ′i , Pj, P−{i,j}).
Claim 1: If r1(Pj) = r1(Pi), then ϕ(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P ′i , Pj, P−{i,j}).
Proof of Claim 1: First, by strategy-proofness, we have that for all t = 1, . . . ,m,
∑
x∈Bt(Pi)
ϕx(Pj, Pj, P−{i,j}) ≤
∑
x∈Bt(Pi)
ϕx(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) ≤
∑
x∈Bt(Pi)
ϕx(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j})
∑
x∈Bt(P ′i )
ϕx(Pj, Pj, P−{i,j}) ≤
∑
x∈Bt(P ′i )
ϕx(P
′
i , Pj, P−{i,j}) ≤
∑
x∈Bt(P ′i )
ϕx(P
′
i , P
′
i , P−{i,j})
17The proof of Lemma 3 of Sen (2011) provides a clear veriﬁcation. We omit the details here.
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Moreover, since r1(Pj) = r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ), we have ϕ(Pj, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ψ(Pj, P−{i,j}) =
ψ(Pi, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) and ϕ(Pj, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ψ(Pj, P−{i,j}) = ψ(P ′i , P−{i,j}) =
ϕ(P ′i , P
′
i , P−{i,j}). Consequently, for all t = 1, . . . ,m, we have
∑
x∈Bt(Pi) ϕx(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) =∑
x∈Bt(Pi) ϕx(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) and
∑
x∈Bt(P ′i ) ϕx(P
′
i , Pj, P−{i,j}) =
∑
x∈Bt(P ′i ) ϕx(P
′
i , P
′
i , P−{i,j}).
Therefore, ϕ(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) and ϕ(P ′i , Pj, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P
′
i , P
′
i , P−{i,j}),
which imply ϕ(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P ′i , Pj, P−{i,j}). 
Next, assume r1(Pj) = r1(Pi). Evidently, either xPjy or yPjx. We assume xPjy. The ver-
iﬁcation related to yPjx is symmetric and we hence omit it. Since xPiy and xPjy, the Exterior
Property implies that there exists an (x, y)-Is-path {P kj }lk=1 ⊆ D connecting Pi and Pj. First,
since P 1j = Pi, Claim 1 implies ϕ(Pi, P
1
j , P−{i,j}) = ϕ(Pi, Pi, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P
′
i , Pi, P−{i,j}) =
ϕ(P ′i , P
1
j , P−{i,j}). Next, following the Is-path {P kj }lk=1, since Pi ∼A P ′i ; xPi!y, yP ′i !x; and x
and y are isolated in (P kj , P
k+1
j ), k = 1, . . . , l − 1, we can repeatedly apply Lemma 1, which
eventually implies ϕ(Pi, Pj, P−{i,j}) = ϕ(P ′i , Pj, P−{i,j}). This completes the veriﬁcation of
the induction hypothesis and the proof of the Theorem. 
4 Applications
In this section, we ﬁrst study two important classes of restricted domains in the literature:
Connected domains in the sense of Sato (2013), and the multi-dimensional single-peaked do-
main introduced by Barbera` et al. (1993). We show that these two classes of domains satisfy
the Interior Property and the Exterior Property, and are therefore tops-only domains. After
establishing the tops-only property for all unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs over the
multi-dimensional single-peaked domain, we further demonstrate that every ex-post eﬃcient
and strategy-proof RSCF deﬁned on this domain is a random dictatorship.
4.1 Restricted connected domains
Sato (2013) introduced the property of weak non-restoration which is imposed on the class
of connected domains and is satisﬁed by many voting domains in the literature.
Definition 3 Domain D is connected with weak non-restoration if given Pi, P
′
i ∈ D
and x, y ∈ A, there exists an Ad-path {P ki }lk=1 ⊆ D connecting Pi and P ′i , and moreover, the
Ad-path satisﬁes the non-restoration property with respect to x and y, i.e.,
[xP ki y and yP
k+1
i x for some 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1] ⇒ [xP ti y, 1 ≤ t ≤ k, and yP t′i x, k + 1 ≤ t′ ≤ l].
Evidently, connectedness with weak non-restoration implies the Exterior Property. How-
ever, the inverse argument does not hold since the Exterior Property only considers two
preferences with distinct peaks, and the related Is-path need not be an Ad-path.
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In this paper, a domain satisfying the Interior Property and connectedness with weak
non-restoration is referred to as a restricted connected domain.18 By the Theorem,
every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF on a restricted connected domain must satisfy
the tops-only property.
Proposition 1 A restricted connected domain is a tops-only domain.
Remark 2 The complete domain, the single-peaked domain (Moulin, 1980; Demange, 1982),
the single-dipped domain (Barbera` et al., 2012) and single-crossing domains (Saporiti, 2009;
Carroll, 2012) are all restricted connected domains, and hence tops-only domains. 
4.2 The multi-dimensional single-peaked domain
In many political and economic settings, the restriction of multi-dimensional single-peakedness
arises naturally. For instance, in a political election, each candidate can be described as a
combination of positions on various political issues, e.g., expenditure on education, health,
etc. Normally, the preference of a voter over all candidates is formulated according to the
criteria of “closeness”, i.e., a candidate with positions “closer” to the voter’s ideal political
attitude is preferred to another candidate with “more distant” positions. Hence, multi-
dimensional single-peakedness is embedded in the formulation of a voter’s preference.
To study multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences, we assume that the alternative set
can be represented as a Cartesian product of a ﬁnite number of sets each of which contains
a ﬁnite cardinality of elements, i.e., A = ×s∈MAs where M = {1, 2, . . . , q} is ﬁnite with
q ≥ 2, and As, referred to as a component set, is ﬁnite with |As| ≥ 2 for each s ∈ M . An
element in a component set As can be denoted as as. A q-tuple a ≡ (a1, a2, . . . , aq) ≡ (as)s∈M
describes an alternative by specifying the element in each component set.19 Given a nonempty
strict subset S ⊆ M , let AS ≡ ×s∈SAs denote the Cartesian product of all component sets
As, s ∈ S, and aS ≡ (as)s∈S ∈ AS denote a combination of elements in As, s ∈ S. Similarly,
let A−S ≡ ×s/∈SAs and a−S ≡ (as)s/∈S ∈ A−S. Accordingly, we can write an alternative
18Sato (2013) shows that connectedness with weak non-restoration is necessary for the equivalence in
DSCFs of strategy-proofness and adjacent manipulation-proofness, a weakening of strategy-proofness where
only a manipulation via a preference adjacent to the sincere one is required to be non-proﬁtable. We note
that the Interior Property is not implied by connectedness with weak non-restoration (for instance, one can
refer to Example 3.2 of Sato (2013)). For our purposes, it is appropriate to combine the Interior Property
with connectedness with weak non-restoration to formulate the class of restricted connected domains.
19Recall the political election example above. All four candidates can be represented by a Cartesian
product of two sets of political issues, A1: expenditure on education, and A2: expenditure on health;
and each component set contains two elements 0 and 1 where 0 represents “low” and 1 represents “high”.
Accordingly, for instance, (0, 1) represents a candidate who favors the low position on education expenditure
and the high position on health expenditure .
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a ≡ (as, a−s) ≡ (aS, a−S). For notational convenience, given s ∈ M and as ∈ As, let
(as, A−s) = {x ∈ A|xs = as}.
We assume moreover that for each s ∈ M , all elements in As are located on a tree,
denoted G(As).20 Let 〈as, bs〉 denote the unique path between as and bs in G(As).21 Com-
bining all trees G(As), s ∈ M , we generate a product of trees ×s∈MG(As) where the
set of vertices is A, and two distinct alternatives a and b constitute an edge if and only if
a−s = b−s for some s ∈ M , and as and bs constitute an edge in G(As). Given a, b ∈ A,
let 〈a, b〉 = {x ∈ A|xs ∈ 〈as, bs〉 for each s ∈ M} denote the “minimal box” containing all
alternatives located between a and b in each dimension.
Definition 4 Given a product of trees ×s∈MG(As), a preference Pi is multi-dimensional
single-peaked on ×s∈MG(As) if for all a, b ∈ A,
[
a ∈ 〈r1(Pi), b〉\{b}
]⇒ [aPib].
Given a product of trees ×s∈MG(As), let DMSP denote the multi-dimensional single-
peaked domain on ×s∈MG(As) containing all admissible preferences.22
Remark 3 Our formulation of multi-dimensional single-peakedness is one where all ele-
ments in each component set are located on a tree. This generalizes the earlier notion intro-
duced by Barbera` et al. (1993) where all elements in each component set must be arranged
on a line. 
The multi-dimensional single-peaked domain satisﬁes both the Interior Property and the
Exterior Property. We provide a simple example to illustrate.
Example 3 Let A ≡ A1 × A2 = {0, 1} × {0, 1}. The product of lines G(A1) × G(A2) and
domain DMSP are speciﬁed in the following diagram and table respectively.
 
 
(0, 1) (1, 1)
(0, 0) (1, 0)
Figure 1: The product of lines G(A1)×G(A2)
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
(0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0)
(1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Table 3: Domain DMSP
20A graph is a combination of vertices and edges. A path in a graph is a sequence of vertices where each
contiguous pair of vertices forms an edge. A tree is a particular graph where between each pair of vertices,
there exists a unique path.
21If as = bs, 〈as, bs〉 = {as} is a singleton set.
22Henceforth, any strict subset of the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain is just referred to as “a
multi-dimensional single-peaked domain”.
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The Interior Property is satisﬁed since P1 ∼A P2, P3 ∼A P4, P5 ∼A P6 and P7 ∼A P8. We
use an instance to illustrate how the requirement of the Exterior Property is met. Note that
(1, 0)P1(0, 1) and (1, 0)P7(0, 1). Correspondingly, {P1, P3, P4, P7} is a
(
(1, 0), (0, 1)
)
-Is-path
connecting P1 and P7, i.e., all B
2(P1) = B
2(P3) = {(0, 0), (1, 0)}, B1(P3) = B1(P4) = {(1, 0)}
and B2(P4) = B
2(P7) = {(1, 0), (1, 1)} include (1, 0) and exclude (0, 1). 
Now, we state the formal result.
Proposition 2 The multi-dimensional single-peaked domain satisﬁes the Interior Property
and the Exterior Property, and is hence a tops-only domain.
The proof of Proposition 2 is available in Appendix B.
4.3 A characterization of strategy-proof RSCFs on the
multi-dimensional single-peaked domain
Deterministic strategy-proof voting rules have been widely explored over the multi-dimensional
single-peaked domain, e.g., voting by committee (Barbera` et al., 1991; Barbera` et al., 2005),
generalized median voter rules (Barbera` et al., 1993, 1997), decomposable rules (Le Breton
and Sen, 1999) and voting by issues (Nehring and Puppe, 2007). In the randomized set-
ting, Dutta et al. (2002) show that every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF is a random
dictatorship when preferences are single-peaked, strictly convex and continuous on a convex
subset of the Euclidean space.
In characterizing strategy-proof DSCFs and RSCFs in the literature mentioned above,
the tops-only property is always established in advance, and this simpliﬁes the rest of the
characterization signiﬁcantly. In particular, in the deterministic setting, the tops-only prop-
erty is used to establish the decomposability property (see Barbera` et al., 1993; Le Breton
and Sen, 1999).23 The subsequent characterization can then be simpliﬁed to a consideration
of each component set. In the randomized environment, the characterization is signiﬁcantly
more subtle since a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF usually fails the independent decom-
posability property (see Chatterji et al., 2012).24 Consequently, any characterization must be
directly derived from the tops-only property, endogenously established in Proposition 2.
23For notational convenience we write a DSCF as f : DN → A. A tops-only DSCF f : DN → A satisﬁes
the decomposability property if there exists a marginal voting rule fs : [As]N → As for each s ∈ M ,
such that for every P ≡ (P1, . . . , PN ) ∈ DN , say r1(Pi) ≡ ai ≡ (asi )s∈M , i ∈ I, the social outcome f(P ) is
simply a combination of all marginal outcomes fs(as1, . . . , a
s
N ), s ∈ M , i.e., f(P ) =
(
fs(as1, . . . , a
s
N )
)
s∈M .
24A tops-only RSCF ϕ : DN → Δ(A) satisﬁes the independent decomposability property if there
exists a marginal random voting rule ϕs : [As]N → Δ(As) for each s ∈ M , such that for every P ≡
(P1, . . . , PN ) ∈ DN , say r1(Pi) ≡ ai ≡ (asi )s∈M , i ∈ I, the probability assigned to x ≡ (xs)s∈M ∈ A equals
to the product of all marginal probabilities ϕsxs(a
s
1, . . . , a
s
N ), s ∈ M , i.e., ϕx(P ) = Πs∈Mϕsxs(as1, . . . , asN ).
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In this section, we demonstrate that every ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof RSCF over
the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain is a random dictatorship. This generalizes the
impossibility result of Barbera` et al. (1991) to the randomized environment.25
An RSCF ϕ : DN → Δ(A) is a random dictatorship if there exists a sequence
[εi]i∈I ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈I εi = 1 such that for all P ∈ DN , ϕ(P ) =
∑
i∈I εier1(Pi). It is
evident that a random dictatorship satisﬁes ex-post eﬃciency, the tops-only property and
strategy-proofness.
Proposition 3 Assume |M | ≥ 3. An ex-post eﬃcient RSCF over DMSP is strategy-proof
if and only if it is a random dictatorship.
The proof of Proposition 3 is available in Appendix C. The proof relies heavily on the
tops-only property. For instance, given a preference proﬁle P ≡ (P1, P2) ∈ D2MSP where the
peaks of two preferences disagree on at least two components, ﬁxing an arbitrary alternative
a other than the two peaks, we pin down the probability assigned to a under proﬁle P
by the following method. We construct another proﬁle P¯ ≡ (P¯1, P¯2) ∈ D2MSP that is top-
equivalent to P , i.e., r1(P¯1) = r1(P1), and r1(P¯2) = r1(P2), such that a is Pareto dominated
in P¯ . Then, ex-post eﬃciency implies that a gets probability zero under P¯ , and ﬁnally the
tops-only property implies that a also receives probability zero under proﬁle P .
Remark 4 The random dictatorship characterization result in Proposition 3 is an instance
of the “extreme-point property”, i.e., every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying some additional
axiom (e.g., unanimity or ex-post eﬃciency) is a convex combination of the counterpart
DSCFs. The extreme-point property is valid over several voting domains, e.g., the com-
plete domain (Gibbard, 1977; Sen, 2011), the binary domain (Picot and Sen, 2012), the
single-peaked domain (Ehlers et al., 2002; Peters et al., 2014; Pycia and U¨nver, 2015), the
lexicographically separable domain (Chatterji et al., 2012) and random dictatorship domains
(Chatterji et al., 2014). On the one hand, the tops-only property is always the key step in
establishing the extreme-point property (see all of the literature mentioned above), while on
the other hand, the violation of the tops-only property is used to illustrate the failure of the
extreme-point property (see Example 1 above). We conjecture that the extreme-point prop-
erty remains valid on the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain when ex-post eﬃciency is
weakened to unanimity.26 
25The separable domain introduced by Barbera` et al. (1991) can be reinterpreted in the Cartesian product
setting and viewed as a particular formulation of the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain where each
component set contains exactly two elements. Theorem 4 of Barbera` et al. (1991) implies that every eﬃcient
DSCF is strategy-proof if and only if it is a dictatorship, provided that the alternative set can be decomposed
in at least three dimensions.
26The tops-only domain result established in Proposition 2 could facilitate the resolution of this long-term
conjecture since on the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain, the study of a unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCF ϕ : DNMSP → Δ(A) has been signiﬁcantly, but without loss of generality, simpliﬁed to the investigation
of the corresponding random voting rule ϕ : AN → Δ(A).
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5 Discussion
In this section we discuss related literature, comment on the necessity of our condition and
provide some ﬁnal remarks.
5.1 Relation to the literature
In DSCFs, general suﬃcient conditions which are used to establish tops-only domains usually
imply that the domains are minimally rich (see for instance Weymark, 2008; Nehring and
Puppe, 2007; Chatterji and Sen, 2011). Our condition is independent of minimal richness,
and therefore includes some non-minimally rich domains, e.g., the single-dipped domain
(Barbera` et al., 2012) and maximal single-crossing domains (Saporiti, 2009).
Chatterji and Sen (2011) also study two non-minimally rich domains: The domain of
in-between preferences (Gravel et al., 2008) and Kelly’s domain (Kelly, 1989), and show that
they are tops-only domains for DSCFs. These two domains do not satisfy our condition
directly. However, observe that for instance, in the domain of in-between preferences, an
alternative which is never the peak of any preference is irrelevant, i.e., it is never a social
choice under any preference proﬁle in any unanimous and strategy-proof DSCF (a similar
argument holds in Kelly’s domain). After inducing new preferences by removing all irrelevant
alternatives, the reﬁned domains satisfy the Interior Property and the Exterior Property.
In the class of minimally rich domains, Chatterji and Sen (2011) propose two general
suﬃcient conditions, Property T and Property T*, for tops-only domains for DSCFs.27 All
commonly studied minimally rich restricted domains that satisfy our condition also satisfy
Property T. However we have not been able to prove that our condition with minimal richness
implies Property T. More importantly, we observe that Property T is no longer suﬃcient for
guaranteeing the tops-only property in RSCFs; domain D of Example 1 satisﬁes Property T
but admits a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF violating the tops-only property.28 We
note that while our condition covers some domains, like maximal single-crossing domains
(Saporiti, 2009) that are excluded by Property T*, we have not been able to ascertain whether
Property T* remains suﬃcient for tops-only domains for RSCFs.
27Property T can only be applied to establish the tops-only property in every two-voter unanimous and
strategy-proof DSCF. Recall the notion of linkedness between two alternatives in footnote 14. A domain D
satisﬁes Property T if for every Pi ∈ D and a ∈ A\{r1(Pi)}, there exists b ∈ A such that bPia and b ∼ a.
Property T* is more sophisticated and is suﬃcient for tops-only domains for DSCFs for an arbitrary number
of voters. The formal deﬁnition of Property T* can be found in Deﬁnition 9 of Chatterji and Sen (2011).
28Recall the notion of linkedness between two alternatives in footnote 14. To verify Property T in domain
D of Example 1, consider for instance preference P1, where we have a1P1a2, a1 ∼ a2; a2P1a3, a2 ∼ a3;
a1P1a5, a1 ∼ a5; a3P1a4 and a3 ∼ a4.
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5.2 Necessity
We observe that the Interior Property and the Exterior Property are not necessary for tops-
only domains. This is not altogether surprising as every random dictatorship domain ensures
the tops-only property.29 While the complete domain is an instance of a random dictatorship
domain that satisﬁes the Interior Property and the Exterior Property, we can use Theorem
3 of Chatterji et al. (2014) to construct a random dictatorship domain violating both the
Interior Property and the Exterior Property and where the tops-only property prevails via
a random dictatorship characterization result (see Example 4 below).
Example 4 Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} and consider the domain D, containing ten preferences,
speciﬁed below.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a3 a3 a3 a4 a4
a2 a3 a1 a3 a4 a1 a2 a4 a2 a3
a3 a2 a3 a1 a1 a2 a1 a2 a1 a1
a4 a4 a4 a4 a3 a4 a4 a1 a3 a2
Table 4: Domain D
First, domain D violates the Interior Property, e.g., Da2 = {P3, P4, P5}, but P5 is not
adjacent to either P3 or P4. Second, domain D violates the Exterior Property, e.g., there exists
no (a1, a3)-Is-path connecting P3 and P9.
30 However, domain D is linked (recall footnote
14) and satisﬁes Condition H of Chatterji et al. (2014) which implies that D is a random
dictatorship domain, and hence a tops-only domain.31 
5.3 Final remarks
In Appendix D.1 we brieﬂy discuss the domain of separable preferences (Le Breton and
Sen, 1999), while in Appendix D.2 we show that the Exterior Property can be replaced by
a weaker version in our Theorem. Finally, we turn to some issues that remain unresolved.
While Example 2 is an instance of a non-tops-only domain that satisﬁes the Interior Property
and violates the Exterior Property, we have been unable to construct an example of a non-
tops-only domain which violates the Interior Property and satisﬁes the Exterior Property.
29A domain is a random dictatorship domain if every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF is a random
dictatorship. Characterizing the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for random dictatorship domains is an
important open question in the literature.
30Note that a1 is ranked above a3 in all preferences {P1, P2, P3, P5, P9}, while a3 is preferred to a1 in all
other preferences. We cannot construct an (a1, a3)-Is-path connecting P3 and P9 in {P1, P2, P3, P5, P9}.
31Recall the notion of linkedness between two alternatives in footnote 14. A domain D satisﬁes Condition
H if there exists x ∈ A, referred to as a hub, such that a ∼ x for all a ∈ A\{x}. Theorem 3 of Chatterji
et al. (2014) shows that a linked domain satisfying Condition H is a random dictatorship domain.
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Second, we have also been unable to establish that the Exterior Property is by itself suﬃcient
for tops-only domains.
Appendix
A Strategy-proofness of RSCF ϕ in Example 1
RSCF ϕ follows three distinct functional forms according to preference proﬁles. Evidently,
if both voters share the same peak of preferences, by unanimity, no one has the incentive to
deviate. Next, it is easy to show that if two social lotteries, which are induced by truthtelling
and misrepresentation respectively of some voter, are both generated by the same functional
form, the one under truthtelling always stochastically dominates the other one according to
the true preference. Therefore, we only need to consider possible manipulations where the
corresponding social lotteries are generated by distinct functional forms. In these possible
manipulations (16 situations speciﬁed below), we assert that probabilities are always trans-
ferred systematically from the preferred alternatives to less preferred alternatives according
to the true preference, which thereby indicates the required stochastic dominance.
We ﬁrst consider voter i’s possible manipulations.32
1. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (P ′i , Pj), where Pi ∈ Da1 , P ′i ∈ {P7, P9} and Pj ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a1Pia3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a5Pia4−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj), and ϕ(P
′
i , Pj)
a3P ′ia1−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4P ′ia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
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2. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (P ′i , Pj), where Pi ∈ Da2 = {P4, P5, P6}, P ′i ∈ {P7, P9} and Pj ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a2Pia3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a2Pia1−−−−−→
1/4
,
a5Pia4−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj) if Pi ∈ {P4, P5};
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a2Pia3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a2Pia4−−−−−→
1/4
,
a5Pia1−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj) if Pi = P6;
ϕ(P ′i , Pj)
a3P ′ia2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1P ′ia2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4P ′ia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj) if P
′
i = P7;
ϕ(P ′i , Pj)
a3P ′ia2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4P ′ia2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1P ′ia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj) if P
′
i = P9.
3. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (P ′i , Pj) where Pi ∈ Da2 , P ′i = P8 and Pj ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a2Pia3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj), and ϕ(P
′
i , Pj)
a3P ′ia2−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
32The notation (Pi, Pj) → (P ′i , Pj) represents a possible manipulation of voter i at (Pi, Pj) via P ′i . The
notation (Pi, Pj) ↔ (P ′i , Pj) represents two possible manipulations of voter i: (i) at (Pi, Pj) via P ′i , and (ii)
at (P ′i , Pj) via Pi.
33The notation ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a1Pia3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a5Pia4−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj) represents that (i) a1Pia3 and a5Pia4, and (ii) from
ϕ(Pi, Pj) to ϕ(P
′
i , Pj), probabilities
1
4 and
1
4 are transferred from a1 to a3, and from a5 to a4 respectively.
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4. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (P ′i , Pj), where Pi ∈ Da4 , P ′i ∈ {P7, P9} and Pj ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a4Pia3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a5Pia1−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj), and ϕ(P
′
i , Pj)
a3P ′ia4−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1P ′ia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
5. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (P ′i , Pj) where Pi ∈ Da1 ∪ Da4 , P ′i = P8 and Pj ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
r1(Pi)Pia3−−−−−−−−→
1/4
,
r1(Pi)Pia2−−−−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj), and ϕ(P
′
i , Pj)
a3P ′i r1(Pi)−−−−−−−−→
1/4
,
a2P ′i r1(Pi)−−−−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
6. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (P ′i , Pj) where Pi ∈ {P7, P9}, P ′i = P8 and Pj ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a1Pia2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4Pia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj) if Pi = P7;
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a4Pia2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1Pia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj) if Pi = P9;
ϕ(P ′i , Pj)
a2P ′ia1−−−−−→
1/4
,
a5P ′ia4−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
7. In (Pi, Pj) → (P ′i , Pj) where Pi ∈ {P7, P9}, P ′i ∈ Da5 and Pj ∈ Da5 .
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a3Pia5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1Pia5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4Pia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj).
8. In (Pi, Pj) → (P ′i , Pj) where Pi = P8, P ′i ∈ Da5 and Pj ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a2Pia5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a3Pia5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(P ′i , Pj).
Next, we consider voter j’s possible manipulations.
9. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (Pi, P ′j), where Pi ∈ {P7, P9}, Pj ∈ Da1 and P ′j ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a1Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a3Pja4−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j), and ϕ(Pi, P
′
j)
a5P ′ja1−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4P ′ja3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
10. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (Pi, P ′j) where Pi = P8, Pj ∈ Da1 = {P1, P2, P3} and P ′j ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a1Pja2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a3Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j) if Pj = P1;
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a1Pja5−−−−−→
1/2
,
a3Pja2−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j) if Pj ∈ {P2, P3};
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j)
a5P ′ja1−−−−−→
1/2
,
a2P ′ja3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
11. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (Pi, P ′j), where Pi ∈ {P7, P9}, Pj ∈ Da2 and P ′j ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a2Pja1−−−−−→
1/4
,
a2Pja4−−−−−→
1/4
,
a3Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j), and ϕ(Pi, P
′
j)
a5P ′ja3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1P ′ja2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4P ′ja2−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
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12. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (Pi, P ′j) where Pi = P8, Pj ∈ Da2 and P ′j ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a2Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a3Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j), and ϕ(Pi, P
′
j)
a5P ′ja2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a5P ′ja3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
13. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (Pi, P ′j), where Pi ∈ {P7, P9}, Pj ∈ Da4 and P ′j ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a4Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a3Pja1−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j), and ϕ(Pi, P
′
j)
a5P ′ja4−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1P ′ja3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
14. In (Pi, Pj) ↔ (Pi, P ′j) where Pi = P8, Pj ∈ Da4 = {P10, P11, P12} and P ′j ∈ Da5 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a4Pja2−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
,
a3Pja5−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j) if Pj = P10;
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a4Pja5−−−−−→
1/2
,
a3Pja2−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j) if Pj ∈ {P11, P12};
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j)
a5P ′ja4−−−−−→
1/2
,
a2P ′ja3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, Pj).
15. In (Pi, Pj) → (Pi, P ′j) where Pi ∈ {P7, P9}, Pj ∈ Da5 and P ′j ∈ Da3 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a5Pja3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a1Pja3−−−−−→
1/4
,
a4Pja3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j).
16. In (Pi, Pj) → (Pi, P ′j) where Pi = P8, Pj ∈ Da5 and P ′j ∈ Da3 ,
ϕ(Pi, Pj)
a5Pja3−−−−−→
1/2
,
a2Pja3−−−−−→
1/4
ϕ(Pi, P
′
j).
B Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 consists of three steps.
Step 1 includes Lemmas 2 - 7. Each lemma shows the existence of a multi-dimensional
single-peaked preference satisfying some particular properties. Step 1 serves as a preparation
for the veriﬁcations in Steps 2 and 3.
Step 2 includes Lemmas 8 and 9. Lemma 8 shows that when two distinct multi-dimensional
single-peaked preferences Pi and P
′
i share the same peak, there exists an Ad-path connecting
them such that for every pair of alternatives with the same relative rankings across Pi and
P ′i , the relative ranking of the pair is ﬁxed along the whole Ad-path. The proof of Lemma
8 is a repeated application of Lemma 3. We provide a simple example to illustrate before
Lemma 8. Lemma 9 shows that when two multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences Pi
and P ′i disagree on peaks in exactly one component, and agree on the relative rankings on
some pair of alternatives x, y ∈ A, there exists an (x, y)-Is-path connecting them. The con-
struction of the (x, y)-Is-path in the proof of Lemma 9 relies completely on the existence of
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the particular multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences speciﬁed in Lemmas 5 and 7, and
the Ad-path constructed in Lemma 8.
Step 3 shows that DMSP satisﬁes the Interior Property and the Exterior Property.
We begin Step 1.
Lemma 2 Given a pair of distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A, if 〈a, b〉 = A, there exists Pi ∈ DaMSP
such that xPiy for all x ∈ 〈a, b〉 and y /∈ 〈a, b〉.
Proof : We can construct an admissible preference in two steps.34 First, pick an arbitrary
P¯i ∈ DaMSP and check whether it satisﬁes the requirement of this lemma. If yes, it is an
admissible preference. Otherwise, we move to the second step. According to P¯i, we induce
two preferences over 〈a, b〉 and A\〈a, b〉 respectively, i.e., (P¯i, 〈a, b〉) and (P¯i, A\〈a, b〉), and
then construct a new preference Pi over A which combines these two induced preferences
such that all alternatives of 〈a, b〉 are ranked above others, i.e., (Pi, 〈a, b〉) = (P¯i, 〈a, b〉),
(Pi, A\〈a, b〉) = (P¯i, A\〈a, b〉) and [x ∈ 〈a, b〉 and y /∈ 〈a, b〉] ⇒ [xPiy]. It is evident that Pi is
a linear order and r1(Pi) = a. To complete the veriﬁcation, we show that Pi is multidimen-
sional single-peaked. Suppose not, i.e., there exist x¯, y¯ ∈ A such that x¯ ∈ 〈a, y¯〉 and y¯Pix¯.
Since x¯ ∈ 〈a, y¯〉, multi-dimensional single-peakedness of P¯i implies x¯P¯iy¯. Thus, Pi and P¯i
disagree on the relative ranking of x¯ and y¯. There are four possible cases: (1) x¯, y¯ ∈ 〈a, b〉,
(2) x¯, y¯ /∈ 〈a, b〉, (3) x¯ ∈ 〈a, b〉 and y¯ /∈ 〈a, b〉, and (4) x¯ /∈ 〈a, b〉 and y¯ ∈ 〈a, b〉. The ﬁrst two
cases are not valid since (Pi, 〈a, b〉) = (P¯i, 〈a, b〉) and (Pi, A\〈a, b〉) = (P¯i, A\〈a, b〉). In case
(3), the construction of Pi implies x¯Piy¯. Contradiction! In the last case, since y¯ ∈ 〈a, b〉, the
hypothesis x¯ ∈ 〈a, y¯〉 implies x¯ ∈ 〈a, b〉. Contradiction! Therefore, Pi ∈ DMSP . 
Lemma 3 Given Pi, P
′
i ∈ DaMSP , assume xPi!y and yP ′ix. There exists P ′′i ∈ DaMSP such
that P ′′i ∼A Pi and yP ′′i !x (equivalently, (x, y) is the local switching pair in Pi and P ′′i .).
Proof : Since r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) = a, it is evident that a /∈ {x, y}. Let P ′′i be a preference
induced by locally switching x and y in Pi. Thus, r1(P
′′
i ) = a, P
′′
i ∼A Pi and yP ′′i !x. We
show P ′′i ∈ DMSP .
Suppose not, i.e., there exist x′, y′ ∈ A such that x′ ∈ 〈a, y′〉 and y′P ′′i x′. Since x′ ∈ 〈a, y′〉,
we know x′Piy′. Since Pi ∼A P ′′i , xPi!y and yP ′′i !x, it must be the case that x′ = x and y′ = y.
Consequently, x ∈ 〈a, y〉 and hence xP ′iy. Contradiction! Therefore, P ′′i ∈ DMSP . 
Lemma 4 Given Pi ∈ DaMSP , s ∈ M and cs ∈ As with 〈as, cs〉 = {as, cs}, there exists
P ′i ∈ DaMSP satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) For all x, y /∈ (cs, A−s), [xPiy] ⇔ [xP ′iy].
34We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this proof.
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(2) For all z−s ∈ A−s, (as, z−s)P ′i !(cs, z−s).
Proof : We ﬁrst construct a preference P ′i satisfying conditions (1) and (2) by the following
method. First, we remove all alternatives in (cs, A−s) from Pi, and thus have an induced
preference
(
Pi, A\(cs, A−s)
)
. Next, we construct preference P ′i over A by plugging all alter-
natives of (cs, A−s) back into the induced preference
(
Pi, A\(cs, A−s)
)
in a particular way:
(as, z−s)P ′i !(c
s, z−s) for all z−s ∈ A−s. Evidently, r1(P ′i ) = a. In the rest of the proof, we
show P ′i ∈ DMSP .
Given x, y ∈ A with x ∈ 〈a, y〉\{y}, we show xP ′iy. Note that xPiy and (as, z−s)Pi(cs, z−s)
for all z−s ∈ A−s. We consider four cases: (i) x, y /∈ (cs, A−s), (ii) x /∈ (cs, A−s) and
y ∈ (cs, A−s), (iii) x ∈ (cs, A−s) and y /∈ (cs, A−s) and (iv) x, y ∈ (cs, A−s).
In case (i), xPiy implies xP
′
iy by condition (1).
In case (ii), y = (cs, y−s). Since x ∈ 〈a, y〉 = 〈a, (cs, y−s)〉 and 〈as, cs〉 = {as, cs}, we
know xs ∈ {as, cs} and x−s ∈ 〈a−s, y−s〉. Moreover, x /∈ (cs, A−s) implies xs = as. Hence
x ∈ 〈a, (as, y−s)〉. Now, either x = (as, y−s) or xPi(as, y−s). If x = (as, y−s), then xP ′iy by
condition (2). If xPi(a
s, y−s), condition (1) ﬁrst implies xP ′i (a
s, y−s). Next, since (as, y−s)P ′iy
by condition (2), we have xP ′iy.
In case (iii), x = (cs, x−s). Evidently, since (as, x−s)Pix and xPiy, we have (as, x−s)Piy.
Then, by condition (1), (as, x−s)P ′iy. Furthermore, since (a
s, x−s)P ′i !x by condition (2), it
must be the case that xP ′iy.
In case (iv), x = (cs, x−s) and y = (cs, y−s) where x−s = y−s. Since x ∈ 〈a, y〉, it is true
that x−s ∈ 〈a−s, y−s〉 and hence (as, x−s) ∈ 〈a, (as, y−s)〉. Consequently, (as, x−s)Pi(as, y−s).
Then, condition (1) implies (as, x−s)P ′i (a
s, y−s). Furthermore, since (as, x−s)P ′i !x and (a
s, y−s)P ′i !y
by condition (2), we have xP ′iy. In conclusion, P
′
i ∈ DMSP . 
Lemma 5 Given Pi ∈ DaMSP and P ′i ∈ D(b
s,a−s)
MSP with a
s = bs, assume xPiy and xP ′iy. There
exists P ′′i ∈ DaMSP satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) For every z−s ∈ A−s, (as, z−s)P ′′i !(cs, z−s) where cs ∈ 〈as, bs〉 and 〈as, cs〉 = {as, cs}.
(2) xP ′′i y.
Proof : We consider two situations: (i) y /∈ (cs, A−s) and (ii) y ∈ (cs, A−s).
Assume that situation (i) occurs. Let P ′′i ∈ DaMSP be a preference induced by Pi satisfying
conditions (1) and (2) in Lemma 4. Hence, condition (1) of this lemma is satisﬁed. Evidently,
either x /∈ (cs, A−s) or x ∈ (cs, A−s). If x /∈ (cs, A−s), by condition (1) of Lemma 4, xPiy
implies xP ′′i y. Next, if x ∈ (cs, A−s), then x = (cs, x−s). Since (as, x−s) ∈ 〈a, x〉 and
xPiy, we have (a
s, x−s)Pix and hence (as, x−s)Piy. Then, condition (1) of Lemma 4 implies
(as, x−s)P ′′i y. Furthermore, since (a
s, x−s)P ′′i !x by condition (1) of this lemma, it must be
the case that xP ′′i y. This completes the veriﬁcation of situation (i).
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Next, assume that situation (ii) occurs. Thus, y = (cs, y−s). Evidently, either x ∈
(cs, A−s) or x /∈ (cs, A−s). First, assume x ∈ (cs, A−s). Thus, x = (cs, x−s). Since xPiy, it
is true that (cs, y−s) = y /∈ 〈a, x〉 = 〈a, (cs, x−s)〉. Consequently, y−s /∈ 〈a−s, x−s〉 and hence
(as, y−s) /∈ 〈a, (as, x−s)〉. By Lemma 2, there exists P¯i ∈ DaMSP such that (as, x−s)P¯i(as, y−s).
Let P ′′i ∈ DaMSP be a preference induced by P¯i satisfying conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma
4. Hence, condition (1) of this lemma is satisﬁed. Since (as, x−s)P¯i(as, y−s), condition (1)
of Lemma 4 implies (as, x−s)P ′′i (a
s, y−s). Since (as, x−s)P ′′i !x and (a
s, y−s)P ′′i !y by condition
(1) of this Lemma, we have xP ′′i y.
Last, assume x /∈ (cs, A−s). We claim (as, y−s) /∈ 〈a, x〉. Suppose not, i.e., (as, y−s) ∈
〈a, x〉. Thus, y−s ∈ 〈a−s, x−s〉. Since cs ∈ 〈as, bs〉, it is true that either cs ∈ 〈as, xs〉
or cs ∈ 〈bs, xs〉. Consequently, either y = (cs, y−s) ∈ 〈(as, a−s), (xs, x−s)〉 = 〈a, x〉, or
y = (cs, y−s) ∈ 〈(bs, a−s), (xs, x−s)〉 = 〈(bs, a−s), x〉, and hence either yPix or yP ′ix. Con-
tradiction! Therefore, (as, y−s) /∈ 〈a, x〉. By Lemma 2, there exists P¯i ∈ DaMSP such that
xP¯i(a
s, y−s). Now, let P ′′i ∈ DaMSP be a preference induced by P¯i satisfying conditions (1)
and (2) of Lemma 4. Hence, condition (1) of this lemma is satisﬁed. By condition (1) of
Lemma 4, xP¯i(a
s, y−s) implies xP ′′i (a
s, y−s). Next, since (as, y−s)P ′′i !y by condition (1) of
this lemma, we have xP ′′i y. This completes the veriﬁcation of situation (ii) and hence the
lemma. 
Lemma 6 Given Pi ∈ DaMSP and P ′i ∈ DbMSP , assume as = bs for all s ∈ S where S ⊆ M
and |S| ≥ 2, and a−S = b−S. Given x, y ∈ A, assume xPiy and xP ′iy. There exist s ∈ S and
P¯i ∈ D(b
s,a−s)
MSP such that xP¯iy.
Proof : Suppose that it is not true. Then, for all s ∈ S and P¯i ∈ D(b
s,a−s)
MSP , yP¯ix which implies
y ∈ 〈(bs, a−s), x〉 for every s ∈ S. Thus, ys ∈ 〈bs, xs〉 for all s ∈ S, and y−S ∈ 〈a−S, x−S〉.
Consequently, y ∈ 〈(bS, a−S), x〉 = 〈b, x〉, and hence yP ′ix. Contradiction! 
We deﬁne a variant of adjacency, called multiple adjacency, for establishing the next
lemma. A pair of preferences Pi and P
′
i is multiple adjacent, denoted Pi ∼MA P ′i , if there
exist multiple pairs of alternatives {(at, a′t)}st=1 such that
(1) for each pair (at, a
′
t), there exists 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 such that rk(Pi) = rk+1(P ′i ) = at and
rk+1(Pi) = rk(P
′
i ) = a
′
t;
(2) for every x /∈ {at, a′t}st=1, [x = rk(Pi)] ⇔ [x = rk(P ′i )].
In the deﬁnition of multiple adjacency, {(at, a′t)}st=1 are referred to as the multiple local
switching pairs in Pi and P
′
i . Multiple adjacency generalizes adjacency by allowing the
co-existence of multiple local switching pairs. Note that multiple adjacency is independent
of multi-dimensional single-peakedness.
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Remark 5 Given a pair of multiple adjacent preferences Pi and P
′
i , let {(at, a′t)}st=1 be the
corresponding multiple local switching pairs. If a pair of alternatives (x, y) /∈ {(at, a′t)}st=1,
then the relative rankings of x and y remains identical in Pi and P
′
i , i.e., [xPiy] ⇔ [xP ′iy],
and more importantly, x and y are isolated in (Pi, P
′
i ). 
Lemma 7 Given Pi ∈ DaMSP , s ∈ M and cs ∈ As, assume (as, z−s)Pi!(cs, z−s) for all z−s ∈
A−s. There exists P ′i ∈ DMSP such that Pi ∼MA P ′i and
{(
(as, z−s), (cs, z−s)
)}
z−s∈A−s are
the multiple local switching pairs in Pi and P
′
i .
Proof : First, by ﬂipping the relative ranking of (as, z−s) and (cs, z−s) in Pi for each
z−s ∈ A−s, and keeping the rankings of all other alternatives ﬁxed, we can construct pref-
erence P ′i such that Pi ∼MA P ′i and the corresponding multiple local switching pairs are{(
(as, z−s), (cs, z−s)
)}
z−s∈A−s . In the rest of the proof, we show P
′
i ∈ DMSP . Note that since
r1(Pi) = a and aPi!(c
s, a−s), it is true that r2(Pi) = (cs, a−s) and hence r1(P ′i ) = (c
s, a−s).
Suppose P ′i /∈ DMSP . Then, there exist x, y ∈ A such that x ∈ 〈(cs, a−s), y〉 and yP ′ix.
We know that either xPiy or yPix. If xPiy, then yP
′
ix implies that (x, y) is one local
switching pair. Thus, x = (as, z−s) and y = (cs, z−s). Consequently, x = (as, z−s) /∈
〈(cs, a−s), (cs, z−s)〉 = 〈(cs, a−s), y〉. Contradiction!
Next, assume yPix. Then, it is true that x /∈ 〈a, y〉. Since x ∈ 〈(cs, a−s), y〉, we know xs ∈
〈cs, ys〉 and x−s ∈ 〈a−s, y−s〉. Furthermore, x /∈ 〈a, y〉 implies xs /∈ 〈as, ys〉. Since a = r1(Pi)
and (cs, a−s) = r2(Pi), it is true that 〈as, cs〉 = {as, cs}. Since xs ∈ 〈cs, ys〉, 〈as, cs〉 = {as, cs}
and xs /∈ 〈as, ys〉, it must be the case that as ∈ 〈cs, ys〉 and xs = cs. Thus, x = (cs, x−s).
Since x−s ∈ 〈a−s, y−s〉, we have (as, x−s) ∈ 〈a, y〉. Thus, either (as, x−s)Piy or (as, x−s) = y.
If (as, x−s)Piy, then (as, x−s)Pi!x implies xPiy. Contradiction! Therefore, (as, x−s) = y and
hence yPi!x and (y, x) is one local switching pair in Pi and P
′
i . Consequently, xP
′
i !y by the
construction of P ′i , a contradiction to the hypothesis yP
′
ix. Therefore, P
′
i ∈ DMSP . 
This completes the veriﬁcation of Step 1. We turn to Step 2.
We ﬁrst provide a simple example to illustrate Lemma 8 below. Given Pi, P
′
i ∈ DaMSP
speciﬁed below, we construct a particular Ad-path connecting Pi and P
′
i in D
a
MSP .
Pi : a b c y x2 x1 x · · ·
P ′i : a b c x · · · · · · y · · ·
Observe that Pi and P
′
i agree on the top-three alternatives and disagree subsequently. There
are exactly two alternatives x2 and x1 ranked between y and x in Pi. Then, by Lemma 3,
we can identify the following three preferences P¯i, Pˆi, P˜i ∈ DaMSP .
P¯i : a b c y x2 x x1 · · ·
Pˆi : a b c y x x2 x1 · · ·
P˜i : a b c x y x2 x1 · · ·
26
where (i) Pi ∼A P¯i, x1Pi!x and xP¯i!x1; (ii) P¯i ∼A Pˆi, x2P¯i!x and xPˆi!x2; and (iii) Pˆi ∼A P˜i,
yPˆi!x and xP˜i!y. Now, P˜i is “closer” to P
′
i than Pi, since P˜i and P
′
i agree on the top-
four alternatives. Next, we identify another ranking position k > 4 such that P˜i and P
′
i
disagree on the kth ranked alternatives, but agree on all alternatives ranked above k, i.e.,
rk(P˜i) = rk(P ′i ) and rk′(P˜i) = rk′(P ′i ) for all 1 ≤ k′ < k. Then, applying the same argument,
we can construct another Ad-path in DaMSP starting from P˜i and reaching some preference
P ′′i “closer” to P
′
i . Eventually, we have an Ad-path in D
a
MSP connecting Pi and P
′
i .
Lemma 8 Given distinct Pi, P
′
i ∈ DMSP , assume r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) ≡ a. There exists an Ad-
path {P ki }lk=1 ⊆ DaMSP connecting Pi and P ′i such that for all x, y ∈ A, [xPiy and xP ′iy] ⇒
[xP ki y, 1 < k < l].
Proof : By the algorithm below, we generate an Ad-path in DaMSP connecting Pi and P
′
i .
Algorithm:
Step 1 : Identify the minimal k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that rk(Pi) = rk(P ′i ) (evidently, k > 1).
For notational convenience, let rk(P
′
i ) = x. Assume x = rk¯(Pi) (evidently, k¯ > k).
Moreover, for notational convenience, let rν(Pi) = xk¯−ν , k ≤ ν ≤ k¯ − 1. By Lemma 3,
we construct a sequence {P (1,ν)i }l1ν=1 ⊆ DaMSP , where l1 = k¯ − k, such that
P
(1,ν−1)
i ∼A P (1,ν)i , xνP (1,ν−1)i !x and xP (1,ν)i !xν , ν = 1, . . . , l1, where P (1,0)i = Pi.
Step t ≥ 2 : According to P (t−1,lt−1)i generated in Step t − 1, identify the minimal k ∈
{1, . . . ,m} such that rk(P (t−1,lt−1)i ) = rk(P ′i ). For notational convenience, let rk(P ′i ) =
x. Assume x = rk¯(P
(t−1,lt−1)
i ) (evidently, k¯ > k). Moreover, for notational convenience,
let rν(P
(t−1,lt−1)
i ) = xk¯−ν , k ≤ ν ≤ k¯ − 1. By Lemma 3, we construct a sequence
{P (t,ν)i }ltν=1 ⊆ DaMSP , where lt = k¯ − k, such that
P
(t,ν−1)
i ∼A P (t,ν)i , xνP (t,ν−1)i !x and xP (t,ν)i !xν , ν = 1, . . . , lt, where P (t,0)i = P (t−1,lt−1)i .
If rk(P
(t−1,lt−1)
i ) = rk(P
′
i ), k = 1, . . . ,m, (in other words, P
(t−1,lt−1)
i = P
′
i ), the algorithm
terminates.
Evidently, this algorithm terminates in ﬁnite steps. Assume that the algorithm terminates
at Step t + 1. Then, we have sequences of preferences {Pi}, {P (1,ν)i }l1ν=1, . . . , {P (t,ν)i }ltν=1.
Combining these sequences, we have an Ad-path
{P ki }lk=1 ≡ {Pi;P (1,1)i , . . . , P (1,l1)i ; . . . ;P (t,1)i , . . . , P (t,lt)i } ⊆ DaMSP
connecting Pi and P
′
i .
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Next, given x, y ∈ A with xPiy and xP ′iy, we show xP ki y, 1 < k < l. Suppose not, i.e.,
there exists 1 < k < l such that yP ki x. Assume w.l.o.g. that xP
k′
i y for all 1 ≤ k′ < k.
Thus, xP k−1i !y and yP
k
i !x. Moreover, we can assume that P
k
i is generated in Step s of the
algorithm, i.e., P ki = P
(s,ν)
i and P
k−1
i = P
(s,ν−1)
i for some 1 ≤ s ≤ t and some 1 ≤ ν ≤ ls.
Thus, P
(s,ν−1)
i ∼A P (s,ν)i , xP (s,ν−1)i !y and yP (s,ν)i !x. Then, according to the algorithm, it must
be the case that yP ′ix. Contradiction! 
Note that according to Remark 1, for all x, y ∈ A with xPiy and xP ′iy, the Ad-path
{P ki }lk=1 in Lemma 8 is also an (x, y)-Is-path connecting Pi and P ′i .
Lemma 9 Given Pi, P
′
i ∈ DMSP , assume r1(Pi) = a and r1(P ′i ) = (bs, a−s) where bs = as
for some s ∈ M . Given x, y ∈ A, assume xPiy and xP ′iy. There exists an (x, y)-Is-path in
DMSP connecting Pi and P
′
i .
Proof : We relabel the interval 〈as, bs〉 = {ask}tk=1 where t ≥ 2, as1 = as, ast = bs, and
ask ∈ 〈as1, ask+1〉, k = 1, . . . , t− 1. Accordingly, ask+1 ∈ 〈ask, ast〉, k = 1, . . . , t− 1.
Claim 1: For every z−s ∈ A−s and 1 ≤ k ≤ t− 1, {x, y} = {(ask, z−s), (ask+1, z−s)}.
Proof of Claim 1: Given z−s ∈ A−s and 1 ≤ k ≤ t−1, since (ask, z−s) ∈ 〈(as1, a−s), (ask+1, z−s)〉 =
〈a, (ask+1, z−s)〉 and (ask+1, z−s) ∈ 〈(ast , a−s), (ask, z−s)〉 = 〈(bs, a−s), (ask, z−s)〉, it is true that
(ask, z
−s)Pi(ask+1, z
−s) and (ask+1, z
−s)P ′i (a
s
k, z
−s). Consequently, xPiy and xP ′iy imply {x, y} =
{(ask, z−s), (ask+1, z−s)}. 
Now, we identify t−1 pairs of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences {(P¯ ki , Pˆ ki )}t−1k=1
speciﬁed below by the repeated application of Lemmas 5 and 7.
Pi : (a
s
1, a
−s) · · · x · · · y · · ·
...
P¯ 1i : (a
s
1, a
−s) (as2, a
−s) · · · (as1, z−s) (as2, z−s) · · · with xP¯ 1i y
Pˆ 1i : (a
s
2, a
−s) (as1, a
−s) · · · (as2, z−s) (as1, z−s) · · · with xPˆ 1i y
...
P¯ ki : (a
s
k, a
−s) (ask+1, a
−s) · · · (ask, z−s) (ask+1, z−s) · · · with xP¯ ki y
Pˆ ki : (a
s
k+1, a
−s) (ask, a
−s) · · · (ask+1, z−s) (ask, z−s) · · · with xPˆ ki y
...
P¯ t−1i : (a
s
t−1, a
−s) (ast , a
−s) · · · (ast−1, z−s) (ast , z−s) · · · with xP¯ t−1i y
Pˆ t−1i : (a
s
t , a
−s) (ast−1, a
−s) · · · (ast , z−s) (ast−1, z−s) · · · with xPˆ t−1i y
...
P ′i : (a
s
t , a
−s) · · · x · · · y · · ·
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According to Lemma 5, r1(P¯
1
i ) = r1(Pi) = a, (a
s
1, z
−s)P¯ 1i !(a
s
2, z
−s) for every z−s ∈ A−s,
and xP¯ 1i y. Next, according to Lemma 7, we can identify Pˆ
1
i ∈ DMSP such that P¯ 1i ∼MA
Pˆ 1i and
{(
(as1, z
−s), (as2, z
−s)
)}
z−s∈A−s is the corresponding multiple local switching pairs.
Furthermore, by Claim 1 and Remark 5, we know that xP¯ 1i y implies xPˆ
1
i y, and moreover, x
and y are isolated in (P¯ 1i , Pˆ
1
i ). By a similar argument, for all k = 2, . . . , t − 1, we have the
pair of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences P¯ ki and Pˆ
k
i , where r1(Pˆ
k−1
i ) = r1(P¯
k
i ),
xP¯ ki y, xPˆ
k
i y, and x and y are isolated in (P¯
k
i , Pˆ
k
i ).
For notational convenience, let Pˆ 0i = Pi and P¯
t
i = P
′
i . For every 1 ≤ k ≤ t, since
r1(Pˆ
k−1
i ) = r1(P¯
k
i ) = (a
s
k, a
−s), xPˆ k−1i y and xP¯
k
i y, Lemma 8 implies that there exists an
(x, y)-Is-path in DMSP connecting Pˆ
k−1
i and P¯
k
i . Combining all (x, y)-Is-paths, we eventually
have an (x, y)-Is-path in DMSP connecting Pi and P
′
i . 
This completes the veriﬁcation of Step 2. Now, we turn to Step 3.
Lemma 10 Domain DMSP satisﬁes the Interior Property.
Proof : This lemma follows from Lemma 8. 
Lemma 11 Domain DMSP satisﬁes the Exterior Property.
Proof : We ﬁx Pi, Pi ∈ DMSP with r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ) and x, y ∈ A with xPiy and xP ′iy. We
consider two situations: (i) r1(Pi) and r1(P
′
i ) disagree on exactly one component, and (ii)
r1(Pi) and r1(P
′
i ) disagree on at least two components.
In situation (i), the requirement of the Exterior Property follows from Lemma 9.
In situation (ii), we assume r1(Pi) = a and r1(P
′
i ) = (b
S, a−S) where as = bs for all
s ∈ S, S ⊆ M and |S| ≥ 2. By a repeated application of Lemma 6, we can relabel
S = {1, . . . , s} such that for each 1 ≤ k ≤ s − 1, there exists P¯ ki ∈ DMSP such that
r1(P¯
k
i ) = (b
1, . . . , bk, ak+1, . . . , as, a−S) and xP¯ ki y.
Let P¯ 0i = Pi and P¯
s
i = P
′
i . Thus, (i) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ s, xP¯ ki y; and (ii) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ s−1,
r1(P¯
k
i ) and r1(P¯
k+1
i ) disagree on exactly one component. Now, for each 0 ≤ k ≤ s − 1, by
Lemma 9, there exists an (x, y)-Is-path in DMSP connecting P¯
k
i and P¯
k+1
i . Finally, combining
these (x, y)-Is-paths, we have an (x, y)-Is-path in DMSP connecting Pi and P
′
i . 
This completes the veriﬁcation of Step 3 and hence proves Proposition 2. We observe that
Proposition 2 remains valid for any subset of the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain
that satisﬁes Lemmas 2 - 7 above since any such subset satisﬁes both the Interior Property
and the Exterior Property. For instance, let Bs ⊆ As, s ∈ M , be such that G(Bs) is a con-
nected sub-graph of G(As), and B = ×s∈MBs. Sub-domain DBMSP = {Pi ∈ DMSP |r1(Pi) ∈
B} satisﬁes Lemmas 2 - 7, and therefore satisﬁes the Interior Property and the Exterior
Property.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
It is evident that a random dictatorship is ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof since it is a
convex combination of dictatorships. We focus on showing the necessity part of Proposition
3. We ﬁrst show that every two-voter ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : D2MSP →
Δ(A) is a random dictatorship.35 Proposition 2 implies that ϕ satisﬁes the tops-only property.
For notational convenience, we can represent a proﬁle P ∈ D2 by a pair of alternatives (a, b)
where r1(P1) = a and r1(P2) = b. We shall also occasionally let (a, P2) denote a proﬁle
(P1, P2) where r1(P1) = a.
Lemma 12 For all a, b ∈ A with a = b, ϕa(a, b) + ϕb(a, b) = 1.
Proof : Claim 1: Given a, b ∈ A with a = b, and x /∈ 〈a, b〉, ϕx(a, b) = 0.
Proof of Claim 1: Since x /∈ 〈a, b〉, there exists unique x′ ∈ 〈a, b〉 such that 〈a, x〉 ∩ 〈b, x〉 =
〈x′, x〉. Accordingly, there exist P1 ∈ DaMSP and P2 ∈ DbMSP such that x′P1x and x′P2x.
Thus, by tops-onlyness and ex-post eﬃciency, we have ϕx(a, b) = ϕx(P1, P2) = 0. 
Claim 2: Given a, b ∈ A, assume as = bs and aτ = bτ for some s, τ ∈ M . Given x ∈
〈a, b〉\{a, b}, ϕx(a, b) = 0.
Proof of Claim 2: Since a and b disagree on at least two components, and x ∈ 〈a, b〉\{a, b}, it
is true that 〈a, b〉\[〈a, x〉 ∪ 〈b, x〉] = ∅. Fixing x′ ∈ 〈a, b〉\[〈a, x〉 ∪ 〈b, x〉], we know x /∈ 〈a, x′〉
and x /∈ 〈b, x′〉. By Lemma 2, there exist P1 ∈ DaMSP and P2 ∈ DbMSP such that x′P1x and
x′P2x. Then, by tops-onlyness and ex-post eﬃciency, ϕx(a, b) = ϕx(P1, P2) = 0. 
According to Claims 1 and 2, we know that for all a, b ∈ A with as = bs and aτ = bτ for
some s, τ ∈ M , ϕa(a, b) + ϕb(a, b) = 1.
Claim 3: Given a, b ∈ A, assume as = bs and a−s = b−s for some s ∈ M . Given x ∈
〈a, b〉\{a, b}, ϕx(a, b) = 0.
Proof of Claim 3: We assume a = (as, x−s), b = (bs, x−s) and x = (xs, x−s) where xs ∈
〈as, bs〉\{as, bs}. We identify two other alternatives b¯ = (bs, yτ , x−s,τ ) and x¯ = (xs, yτ , x−s,τ )
where (xτ , yτ ) is an edge in G(Aτ ).36 Since as = bs = b¯s and aτ = xτ = yτ = b¯τ , Claims 1 and
2 imply ϕx(a, b¯) = 0 and ϕx¯(a, b¯) = 0. Given b and b¯, by Lemmas 4 and 7, we have P2 ∈ DbMSP
and P ′2 ∈ Db¯MSP such that P2 ∼MA P ′2; (xτ , z−τ )P2!(yτ , z−τ ) and (yτ , z−τ )P ′2!(xτ , z−τ ) for all
z−τ ∈ A−τ . By tops-onlyness and strategy-proofness, ϕx(a, b) + ϕx¯(a, b) = ϕx(a, P2) +
ϕx¯(a, P2) = ϕx(a, P
′
2) + ϕx¯(a, P
′
2) = ϕx(a, b¯) + ϕx¯(a, b¯) = 0. Hence, ϕx(a, b) = 0. 
35In the case of two voters, we do not require |M | ≥ 3. When the number of voters increases to at least
3, the restriction |M | ≥ 3 must be imposed.
36Alternatives b¯ and x¯ exist since A = ×q∈MAq and |M | ≥ 2.
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As a consequence of Claims 1 and 3, we know that for all a, b ∈ A with as = bs and
a−s = b−s for some s ∈ M , ϕa(a, b) + ϕb(a, b) = 1. Therefore, by Claims 1, 2 and 3,
ϕa(a, b) + ϕb(a, b) = 1 for all a, b ∈ A with a = b. 
Lemma 13 Given a, b; x, y ∈ A with a = b and x = y, ϕa(a, b) = ϕx(x, y).
Proof : Assume ϕa(a, b) = λ. We consider two cases: (i) either x /∈ {a, b} or y /∈ {a, b}, and
(ii) x ∈ {a, b} and y ∈ {a, b}.
In case (i), we assume w.l.o.g. that x /∈ {a, b}. The veriﬁcation related to y /∈ {a, b}
is symmetric and we hence omit it. Since |M | ≥ 2, there exists a sequence {ak}tk=1 ⊆ A
such that a1 = a, at = x, (ak, ak+1) is an edge in ×s∈MG(As), k = 1, . . . , t − 1, and
b /∈ {ak}tk=1. Given a1 and a2, we have P1 ∈ Da1MSP and P ′1 ∈ Da2MSP such that r2(P1) =
a2 and r2(P
′
1) = a1. By tops-onlyness and strategy-proofness, ϕa1(a1, b) + ϕa2(a1, b) =
ϕa1(P1, b) + ϕa2(P1, b) = ϕa1(P
′
1, b) + ϕa2(P
′
1, b) = ϕa1(a2, b) + ϕa2(a2, b). Then, Lemma
12 implies ϕa2(a2, b) = ϕa1(a1, b) = λ. Following the sequence {ak}tk=1 and repeatedly
applying the symmetric argument step by step, we have ϕx(x, b) = ϕat(at, b) = λ. Hence,
ϕb(x, b) = 1 − λ by Lemma 12. If y = b, the veriﬁcation is completed. We assume y = b.
Then, there exists a sequence {bk}t′k=1 ⊆ A such that b1 = b, bt′ = y, (bk, bk+1) is an edge
in ×s∈MG(As), k = 1, . . . , t′ − 1, and x /∈ {bk}t′k=1. Following the sequence {bk}t′k=1, by a
symmetric argument, we have ϕy(x, y) = 1−λ. Then, by Lemma 12, ϕx(x, y) = λ = ϕa(a, b).
In case (ii), since x = y, it must be either (x, y) = (a, b) or (x, y) = (b, a). The lemma
evidently holds if (x, y) = (a, b). Assume (x, y) = (b, a). Fix x′ /∈ {a, b}. Between (a, b) and
(x′, b), since x′ /∈ {a, b}, the veriﬁcation of case (i) implies ϕx′(x′, b) = λ. Similarly, between
(b, a) and (x′, b), since x′ /∈ {b, a}, the veriﬁcation of case (i) implies ϕb(b, a) = ϕx′(x′, b) = λ.
Thus, ϕa(a, b) = ϕb(b, a). This completes the veriﬁcation of the lemma. 
Fixing arbitrary a, b ∈ A with a = b, let ϕa(a, b) = λ. We show that for all x, y ∈ A,
ϕ(x, y) = λex + (1− λ)ey. If x = y, it evidently holds. If x = y, it holds by Lemmas 12 and
13. Therefore, ϕ is a random dictatorship.
Next, we modify the Ramiﬁcation Theorem of Chatterji et al. (2014) so that the random
dictatorship result over DMSP (henceforth, assume |M | ≥ 3) can be extended to the case of
an arbitrary number of voters. We ﬁrst introduce the primary induction hypothesis.
The Primary Induction Hypothesis : Given N > 2, for all 2 ≤ n < N , we have
[ϕ : DnMSP → Δ(A) is ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof] ⇒ [ϕ is a random dictatorship].
Fixing an ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : DNMSP → Δ(A), we show that ϕ
is a random dictatorship. By Proposition 2, RSCF ϕ satisﬁes the tops-only property.
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Lemma 14 RSCF ϕ is a quasi random dictatorship, i.e., there exists [εi]i∈I ∈ RN+ with∑
i∈I εi = 1 such that for all P ∈ DNMSP with Pi = Pj for some i, j ∈ I, ϕ(P ) =
∑
i∈I εier1(Pi).
Proof : We consider two cases: N > 3 and N = 3. If N > 3, the veriﬁcation is exactly
identical to the veriﬁcation of Proposition 5 of Chatterji et al. (2014) by simply changing
“unanimity” to “ex-post eﬃciency”. Thus, we focus on the case N = 3.37
According to RSCF ϕ : D3 → Δ(A), we deﬁne three RSCFs as follows: g(2,3)(P1, P2) =
ϕ(P1, P2, P2), g
(1,3)(P1, P2) = ϕ(P1, P2, P1) and g
(1,2)(P1, P3) = ϕ(P1, P1, P3) for all P1, P2, P3 ∈
D. Evidently, g(2,3), g(1,3) and g(1,2) are ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof. Then, g(2,3), g(1,3)
and g(1,2) are random dictatorships by the primary induction hypothesis. Thus, there exist
ε1, ε2, ε3 ≥ 0 such that for all P1, P2, P3 ∈ D,
ϕ(P1, P2, P2) = g
(2,3)(P1, P2) = ε1 er1(P1) + (1− ε1)er1(P2)
ϕ(P1, P2, P1) = g
(1,3)(P1, P2) = (1− ε2)er1(P1) + ε2 er1(P2)
ϕ(P1, P1, P3) = g
(1,2)(P1, P3) = (1− ε3)er1(P1) + ε3 er1(P3)
To establish that ϕ is a quasi random dictatorship, it suﬃces to show ε1 + ε2 + ε3 = 1.
Fixing {1, 2, 3} ⊆ M ; {xs, ys} ⊆ As where (xs, ys) is an edge in G(As), s = 1, 2, 3, and
z−{1,2,3} ∈ A−{1,2,3}, we identify the following eight alternatives (see the diagram below):
a = (x1, x2, x3, z−{1,2,3}), b = (y1, y2, x3, z−{1,2,3}), c = (y1, x2, y3, z−{1,2,3});
a¯ = (x1, y2, x3, z−{1,2,3}), b¯ = (y1, y2, y3, z−{1,2,3}), c¯ = (x1, x2, y3, z−{1,2,3});
x¯ = (y1, x2, x3, z−{1,2,3}), y¯ = (x1, y2, y3, z−{1,2,3}).
 
 
 
 
c c¯
x¯ a
a¯
y¯
b
b¯






Figure 2: The geometric relations among a, b, c, a¯, b¯, c¯, x¯ and y¯
By Lemma 2, we can construct two preference proﬁles: P = (P1, P2, P3) ∈ D3MSP and
P ′ = (P ′1, P
′
2, P
′
3) ∈ D3MSP such that the following ﬁve conditions are satisﬁed
37Proposition 4 of Chatterji et al. (2014) characterizes quasi random dictatorship in the case of three
voters. Their veriﬁcation relies on an additional condition called Richness Condition α. However, DMSP
violates Richness Condition α. Instead, the proof of Lemma 14 relies on the restriction of multi-dimensional
single-peakedness and the tops-only property.
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(i) r1(P1) = r1(P
′
1) = a, r1(P2) = r1(P
′
2) = b and r1(P3) = r1(P
′
3) = c;
(ii) r2(P1) = x¯, r3(P1) = a¯ and r4(P1) = b;
(iii) r2(P2) = x¯, r3(P2) = b¯ and r4(P2) = c;
(iv) r2(P3) = x¯, r3(P3) = c¯ and r4(P3) = a;
(v) y¯P ′i x¯, i = 1, 2, 3
By a similar argument to the one in the proof of Proposition 4 of Chatterji et al. (2014),
we ﬁrst have ϕa(P ) = ε1, ϕb(P ) = ε2, ϕc(P ) = ε3 and ϕx(P ) = 0 for all x /∈ {a, b, c, x¯}.
Moreover, since ϕx¯(P ) = ϕx¯(P
′) = 0 by tops-onlyness and ex-post eﬃciency, we have ε1 +
ε2 + ε3 = ϕa(P ) + ϕb(P ) + ϕc(P ) =
∑
x∈A ϕx(P ) = 1, as required. 
Furthermore, following the argument of Lemma 14 of Chatterji et al. (2014), we know that
for all P ∈ DNMSP with r1(Pi) = r1(Pj) for some i, j ∈ I, ϕ(P ) =
∑
i∈I εier1(Pi). Therefore, to
complete the veriﬁcation of the primary induction hypothesis, we show in Lemmas 15 and
16 below that for all P ∈ DN with r1(Pi) = r1(Pj) for all i, j ∈ I, ϕ(P ) =
∑
i∈I εier1(Pi).
We ﬁrst introduce new notation. Given a nonempty subset Iˆ ⊆ I and PIˆ ∈ D|Iˆ|, let
τ(PIˆ) = ∪i∈Iˆ
{
r1(Pi)
}
denote the set of peaks in PIˆ . Given Pi ∈ D and a ∈ A, let W (Pi, a) =
{x ∈ A|aPix} denote the (strict) lower contour set of a at Pi. Given P ∈ DN with |τ(P )| = N ,
let W (P ) = ∪i∈IW
(
Pi,max(Pi, τ(P−i))
)
.
Lemma 15 For all P ∈ DNMSP with |τ(P )| = N and x ∈ W (P ), ϕx(P ) =
∑
i∈I:r1(Pi)=x εi.
Proof : This lemma follows from Lemma 16 of Chatterji et al. (2014). 
Lemma 16 For all P ∈ DNMSP with |τ(P )| = N , ϕ(P ) =
∑
i∈I εier1(Pi).
Proof : Fix P ∈ DNMSP with |τ(P )| = N . For notational convenience, let ai = r1(Pi) for all
i ∈ I. We can identify two voters i, j ∈ I such that the minimal box 〈ai, aj〉 contains no other
voter’s peak, i.e., 〈ai, aj〉 ∩ τ(P−{i,j}) = ∅. By Lemma 2, we have two preferences P¯i ∈ DaiMSP
and P¯j ∈ DajMSP such that for all x ∈ 〈ai, aj〉 and y /∈ 〈ai, aj〉, xP¯iy and xP¯jy. Thus, for all
l /∈ {i, j}, al ∈ W (P¯i, P¯j, P−{i,j}) and hence ϕal(P ) = ϕal(P¯i, P¯j, P−{i,j}) = εl by tops-onlyness
and Lemma 15. Moreover, by tops-onlyness, strategy-proofness and quasi random dictator-
ship, we have
∑
x∈〈ai,aj〉 ϕx(P ) =
∑
x∈〈ai,aj〉 ϕx(P¯i, P¯j, P−{i,j}) =
∑
x∈〈ai,aj〉 ϕx(P¯i, P¯i, P−{i,j}) =
ϕai(P¯i, P¯i, P−{i,j}) = εi + εj.
Choose arbitrary l ∈ I\{i, j}. We know that either aiPlaj or ajPlai. Thus, either aj ∈
W (P ) or ai ∈ W (P ). Hence, either ϕaj(P ) = εj or ϕai(P ) = εi by Lemma 15. Assume ajPlai.
Thus, ai ∈ W (P ) and ϕai(P ) = εi. The veriﬁcation related to the other case is symmetric
and we hence omit it. To complete the veriﬁcation, it suﬃces to show either ϕaj(P ) = εj or
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ϕai(P ) + ϕaj(P ) = εi + εj. If there exists P¯l ∈ DalMSP such that aiP¯laj, then aj ∈ W (P¯l, P−l)
and hence, by tops-onlyness and Lemma 15, ϕaj(P ) = ϕaj(P¯l, P−l) = εj, as required. If
ajP¯lai for all P¯l ∈ DalMSP , then it must be the case that aj ∈ 〈al, ai〉. Hence, 〈aj, ai〉 ⊆ 〈al, ai〉
and ajPlx for all x ∈ 〈ai, aj〉\{ai, aj} by multi-dimensional single-peakedness. Consequently,
for all x ∈ 〈ai, aj〉\{ai, aj}, x ∈ W (P ), and hence, ϕx(P ) = 0 by Lemma 15. Therefore,
ϕai(P ) + ϕaj(P ) =
∑
x∈〈ai,aj〉 ϕx(P ) = εi + εj, as required. 
Now, we assert that RSCF ϕ : DNMSP → Δ(A) is a random dictatorship. This completes
the veriﬁcation of the primary induction hypothesis and hence proves Proposition 3.
D Some additional material
D.1 Separable preferences
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the domain of separable preferences (Le Breton and Sen,
1999). Recall the Cartesian product setting in Section 4.2.
Definition 5 A preference Pi is separable if for all s ∈ M and as, bs ∈ As, we have
[
(as, x−s)Pi(bs, x−s) for some x−s ∈ A−s
]⇒ [(as, y−s)Pi(bs, y−s) for all y−s ∈ A−s
]
.
Let DS denote the separable domain containing all separable preferences. We provide an
example to illustrate how the Interior Property is violated by the separable domain when
one component set contains at least 3 elements.
Example 5 Let A = {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1} and consider the sub-domain of all ten separable
preferences with the peak (0, 0), speciﬁed below.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (2, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0)
(1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (2, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0)
(2, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (2, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (2, 1) (2, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
(1, 1) (2, 0) (2, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (2, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (2, 1) (2, 1)
(2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
Table 5: The sub-domain of all separable preferences with the peak (0, 0)
We can separate all ten preferences of Table 5 into two groups: {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5} and
{P6, P7, P8, P9, P10}. In each group, preferences are consecutively adjacent, i.e., Pk ∼A Pk+1,
1 ≤ k ≤ 4 and 6 ≤ k ≤ 9. However, between two groups, there exists no pair of adjacent
preferences. Therefore, the Interior Property fails. From the ﬁrst group to the second group,
we have to adopt the notion of multiple adjacency introduced in the proof of Proposition 2,
e.g., P1 ∼MA P6 and P5 ∼MA P10. 
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One way to show that the separable domain is a tops-only domain might be to weaken
the Interior Property so that the co-existence of adjacencies and multiple adjacencies in each
sub-domain with the same peak is allowed, and correspondingly strengthen the Exterior
Property so that the multiple local switching pairs in two multiple adjacent preferences can
be covered. We leave a formal treatment for future work.
D.2 A weakening of the Exterior Property
In this section, we provide a weaker suﬃcient condition for tops-only domains. We weaken
the Exterior Property by deﬁning it with respect to the local switching pairs involved in the
Interior Property. This weakening is referred to as the weak Exterior Property, and helps
eliminate redundant Is-paths in the domain. The proof of the Theorem can be easily modiﬁed
to show that a domain satisfying the Interior Property and the weak Exterior Property is
also a tops-only domain.
Definition 6 A domain D satisﬁes the weak Exterior Property if given Pi, P
′
i ∈ D with
r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i ), and x, y ∈ A with xPi!y and xP ′iy, we have
[there exists P¯i ∈ D such that r1(Pi) = r1(P¯i), Pi ∼A P¯i and yP¯i!x]
⇒ [there exists an (x, y)-Is-path connecting Pi and P ′i ].
In the deﬁnition of the weak Exterior Property, preference P¯i can be viewed as a bench-
mark preference which tests whether Pi and (x, y) are critical in the sense that Pi and P¯i
share the same peak, and are adjacent to each other with the local switching pair (x, y).
Once the criticality is veriﬁed, the weaker Exterior Property requires the existence of a
(x, y)-Is-path connecting Pi and P
′
i . The following corollary shows that the combination of
the Interior Property and the weak Exterior Property is suﬃcient for tops-only domains.
Corollary 1 A domain satisfying the Interior Property and the weaker Exterior Property
is a tops-only domain.
Proof : The veriﬁcation of Corollary 1 follows from a slight modiﬁcation of the proof of the
Theorem. Replace the ﬁfth sentence of the last paragraph in the proof of the Theorem by
the following sentence: Since (i) r1(Pi) = r1(Pj), xPi!y and xPjy, and (ii) r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i );
Pi ∼A P ′i and yP ′i !x, the weaker Exterior Property implies that there exists an (x, y)-Is-path
{P kj }lk=1 ⊆ D connecting Pi and Pj. 
We provide the following example to illustrate the weak Exterior Property, and show
thereby that more tops-only domains can be covered by the weaker suﬃcient condition.
Example 6 Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} and consider the domain D, containing ﬁve preferences,
speciﬁed below.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
a1 a2 a2 a3 a4
a2 a3 a3 a2 a3
a3 a1 a4 a4 a2
a4 a4 a1 a1 a1
Table 6: Domain D
Domain D satisﬁes the Interior Property, i.e., P2 ∼A P3. To verify whether the Exterior
Property is met, the (a3, a4)-Is-path {P1, P2, P3, P4} which connects P1 and P4 must be
considered. However, the Exterior Property fails in domain D, as there exists no (a2, a3)-Is-
path connecting P1 and P2. Consequently, the Theorem cannot be applied to verify whether
D is a tops-only domain. Note that neither P1 and (a3, a4), nor P2 and (a2, a3) are critical.
Therefore, the (a3, a4)-Is-path {P1, P2, P3, P4} is redundant, and the non-existence of (a2, a3)-
Is-path connecting P1 and P2 does not matter. On the contrary, P3 and (a4, a1) are critical
according to the bench-mark preference P2. Correspondingly, we have {P3, P4, P5} as an
(a4, a1)-Is-path connecting P3 and P5. One can easily verify that domain D satisﬁes the
weak Exterior Property and therefore domain D is a tops-only domain. 
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